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ARTICLES 
 
It’s Not About the Money:  
THE ROLE OF PREFERENCES, COGNITIVE BIASES, 
AND HEURISTICS AMONG PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES 
Michael A. McCann† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Professional athletes are often regarded as selfish, 
greedy, and out-of-touch with regular people.  They hire agents 
who are vilified for negotiating employment contracts that 
occasionally yield compensation in excess of national gross 
domestic products.1  Professional athletes are thus commonly 
assumed to most value economic remuneration, rather than the 
“love of the game” or some other intangible, romanticized 
inclination. 
Lending credibility to this intuition is the rational actor 
model; a law and economic precept which presupposes that 
when individuals are presented with a set of choices, they 
rationally weigh costs and benefits, and select the course of 
  
 † Assistant Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law; LL.M., 
Harvard Law School; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law; B.A., Georgetown 
University.  Prior to becoming a law professor, the author was a Visiting 
Scholar/Researcher at Harvard Law School and a member of the legal team for former 
Ohio State football player Maurice Clarett in his lawsuit against the National Football 
League and its age limit (Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), 
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (Apr. 4, 2005)).  The author wishes to thank Paul Weiler 
and Stephen Greyser for their insight and inspiration and Russell Korobkin, Jeffrey 
Rachlinski, Nancy Levit, Donald Langevoort, William Li, and Bryan Stroh for their 
thoughtful comments on an earlier draft. 
 1 In the extreme example, consider the ten-year, $252 million contract Alex 
Rodriguez signed with the Texas Rangers in 2002.  $252 million represents eleven 
times the value of North Korea’s Gross Domestic Product.  See John Blanchette, But 
It’s Baseball That Is the Real Loser in This Absurd Deal, SPOKESMAN REV., Dec. 12, 
2000, at C1. 
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action that maximizes their wealth, happiness, or satisfaction.2  
Since athletes are generally presumed to most value financial 
compensation, they simply behave “rationally” by selecting the 
most lucrative offer. 
Intriguingly, however, for every apparent athletic 
mercenary, there appear to be many who significantly discount 
financial compensation.  Indeed, for a variety of expressed 
motivations, professional athletes regularly select the non-
optimal contract offer, at least in the traditional sense of 
optimality.  Risk aversion and other deliberative strategies 
occasionally provide an explanation, but more often, the reason 
lies in intangibles, such as loyalty, regional affinity, weather 
preferences, familiarity with certain teammates or coaches, 
prospects for team success, and demographic traits.   
A law and economic explanation for such behavior 
would illuminate the ranking of alternative preferences, and 
then, as reflected by choice, a maximization of such ranking.  
Put differently, by accepting a less remunerative offer, 
professional athletes may consciously substitute subjective 
value for objective value, and their choice simply reflects that 
which makes them most happy.   
Though diagrammatic in many instances, preferences 
may not universally explain decision-making among 
professional athletes.  Indeed, like all individuals, professional 
athletes appear vulnerable to cognitive biases, which are 
subconscious mental errors triggered by simplified 
informational processes, and heuristics, which are convenient, 
if unfinished predictive cues.  Though cognitive biases and 
heuristics enable individuals to manage a complex array of 
stimuli, they often distort preferences and adversely affect 
decision-making.  For instance, because of confirmation bias, 
individuals are subject to ignore or discount information that 
challenges existing beliefs.  Alternatively, optimism bias leads 
individuals to assume that general risks do not apply with 
equal force to themselves.   
In the context of professional sports, these and other 
cognitive distortions may impair not only the pursuit of 
objective value, but also rational assessment of subjective 
value.  This is especially true when teams adroitly manipulate 
distortions, such as impressing illusory variances among 
  
 2 See Peter A. Alces, “If You Don’t Have Anything Good to Say . . . .,” 15 
BANKR. DEV. J. 383, 409, 411-12 (1999) (reviewing KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND 
FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM (1997)). 
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themselves and other teams.  Accordingly, when accepting a 
less remunerative offer, professional athletes may have 
unknowingly misinterpreted their preferences and rankings. 
To date, no published analysis has addressed the 
potential influence of behavioral tendencies on professional 
athletes in contemplation of contract offers.  Perhaps this is not 
surprising, given the relative paucity of professional athletes 
among the general population, their presumptively unique 
modes of employment, and a general aversion among 
academics to the study of sports.  A more scrupulous 
assessment of professional athletes, however, suggests a 
uniquely desirable group for examination.  Indeed, aside from 
their striking influence on the world and economy around 
them, professional athletes, unlike most groups commonly 
studied by academics, furnish published commentary of their 
thought processes, typically through newspaper, television, and 
radio interviews.  Accordingly, professional athletes offer a 
wealth of narration as to their values, beliefs, and priorities, 
and, equally important, such narration occurs in real world 
settings, rather than in experimental circumstances.  Along 
those lines, by evading the alleged “experimental flaw” of many 
behavioral law and economic studies, analysis of decision-
making among professional athletes may prove extraordinarily 
salient in the broader discussion of behavioral sciences and 
their influence on traditional law and economics. 
In pursuit of the above phenomena, this Article will 
begin by exploring the rational actor model and how 
individuals utilize preferences in determining their optimal 
choice.  This Article will then discuss limitations to the rational 
actor model, namely the role of cognitive biases and heuristics.  
Thereafter, this Article will canvass decision-making among 
professional athletes in contemplation of contract offers.  In 
that regard, this Article will examine why some professional 
athletes pursue the most lucrative offer, while others do not, 
and to what extent cognitive biases and heuristics influence 
their decision-making.  This Article will conclude by 
highlighting implications for professional sports and proposing 
recommendations for further analysis by economists, 
psychologists, and legal academics. 
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II. EXPLORING THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL IN 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
A. Choice and Utility Among Rational Actors 
In assessing explanations for why individuals choose 
one option over another, many theories have emerged.  In the 
context of economic activity, the rational choice theory has 
received particular praise for its alleged ability to predict 
human behavior.3  It posits that individuals are selfish actors 
who seek maximum utility, and when presented with a set of 
alternatives, select the alternative offering greatest utility.4  
Utility may embody objective ends, such as material wealth or 
tangible property.5  It may also comprise subjective goals, such 
as happiness or satisfaction.6  Irrespective of its characteristics, 
utility is thought to demand a set of preferences that 
encourages a particular behavior, namely the satisfaction of 
utility-driven preferences in the most efficient manner.7  Put 
differently, “rationality” consists of pursuing preferences at 
minimal cost.8   
While in search of maximum utility, rational actors are 
presumed to embody only “selfish” interests.9  Rational choice 
theorists contend that pursuit of selfish interests promotes 
cooperation with other persons.  Such a contention is partly 
deduced from the scholarship of Robert Axelrod, who, in The 
  
 3 See, e.g., Mark R. Brown, Deterring Bully Government: A Sovereign 
Dilemma, 76 TUL. L. REV. 149, 160 n.59 (2001); Ronald A. Cass, Economics and 
International Law, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 473, 509 n.114 (1997); Richard H. 
Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2061 
(1996). 
 4 See Alces, supra note 2, at 412. 
 5 See Alice G. Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy, 33 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 1, 28 n.64 (1996) (noting that when economists refer to “maximizing utility,” 
they typically equate utility with material wealth). 
 6 See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law 
and Economics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 483, 513 n.103 (describing traditional law and 
economic metric of utility as a measure of happiness); see also Steven P. Croley & Jon 
D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort 
Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1794-96 (1995) (discussing concept of satisfaction as an 
economic metric). 
 7 See W. Bradley Wendel, Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories of Social 
Norms and the Pragmatics of Explanation, 77 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (2002). 
 8 See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 11-
12 (1989).  
 9 See Pamela H. Bucy, Games and Stories: Game Theory and the Civil False 
Claims Act, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 603, 625 (2004); see also Neil S. Siegel, Sen and the 
Hart of Jurisprudence: A Critique of the Economic Analysis of Judicial Behavior, 87 
CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1583-85 (1999) (discussing self-interest among legal actors). 
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Evolution of Cooperation, concludes that humans interact 
optimally when their choices depend upon relative 
cooperativeness, patience, and egocentricity.10  Thus, rather 
than for the promotion of societal objectives, laws and 
normative aspirations are thought to emerge only to facilitate 
self-interested parties in achieving maximum utility.11  
Naturally, a purely self-interested pursuit might render 
individuals predictable, since it would signal anticipated 
responses to incentives and other external influences.12  This is 
particularly true if, as rational choice theorists contend, 
preferences are “ranked, continuous, and stable.”13  Indeed, the 
presumption of stable preferences buttresses the very use and 
measurability of rational choice analysis; without such 
stability, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine 
whether a particular choice represents accordance with 
preferences, change in preferences, or simply disregard of 
preferences.14 
A methodological preference among rational choice 
theorists for equating “utility” with monetary wealth signifies 
another component of rational choice analysis.15  Such 
preference enables legal economists to cultivate a more 
quantifiable framework,16 while also complying with traditional 
economic assessment of behavioral success by level of 
  
 10 See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 31-33 (1984) (on 
file with author). 
 11 See Robert Sugden, Contractarianism and Norms, 100 ETHICS 768, 786 
(1990); see also AXELROD, supra note 10, at 6-8 (examining role of aspirations in pursuit 
of utility).  
 12 See Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 54 (1987). 
 13 Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the 
New Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 973, 976-77 
(2000).  Contra DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE 
THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 17-19 (1994) (finding that 
it may be impossible to determine whether a changed decision over time reflects a 
violation of the rationality criteria or a change in preferences). 
 14 See Rostain, supra note 13, at 977. 
 15 See Wendel, supra note 7, at 8 (noting that rational choice theory might be 
objectionable because of its overriding concern with wealth maximization); see also 
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1066 (2000) 
(concluding that monetary accumulation is typically cited as the underlying motivation 
for rational actors). 
 16 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The 
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 641 n.31 (1999) [hereinafter 
Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation]. 
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accumulated resources.17  It also, by implication, engenders a 
normative ethic whereby “it is normal—and hence 
appropriate—for people to pursue monetary wealth” and to 
measure the achievement of others by their extent of financial 
wealth.18  Put differently then, rational choice theorists 
generally assume that “rational actors will seek to gratify 
fundamental biological drives and, in a market economy, to 
accumulate monetary wealth.”19 
Nevertheless, “utility” need not equate to monetary 
wealth in order to accommodate rational choice analysis.  
Indeed, though less preferred for purposes of rational choice 
analysis, individuals may place material value in measurable, 
but non-monetary forms of “wealth,” such as proximity to 
family or professional title.20  Similarly, individuals may value 
intangible wealth, such as perceived prestige or sense of 
fairness,21 and yet still engage in rational analysis.22  In other 
words, rational decision-making need not comprise the pursuit 
of maximum monetary wealth, but only that personal 
preferences are discernibly ranked and pursued accordingly.23 
B. Application of Rational Choice Theory to Behavioral 
Relationships 
Legal scholars have applied rational choice theory to 
human behavior in specific and relatively familiar settings.  
  
 17 See David R. Lagasse, Undue Influence: Corporate Political Speech, Power 
and the Initiative Process, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1347, 1370 (1995) (explaining traditional 
economic reliance on monetary gains and losses when evaluating micro-economic 
behavior). 
 18 Avery Wiener Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Economics, 
94 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2243 (1996). 
 19 Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rational, Normative and Cognitive 
Perspectives in the Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 475, 478. 
 20 See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Ranking Journals: Some Thoughts on Theory 
and Methodology, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 851, 860-62 (1999) (noting that, because 
student-run law reviews often select submissions in part based on the affiliation of the 
author, law professors consider reputation of their affiliated school when choosing 
between teaching offers). 
 21 See Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
279, 280 (2001) (reviewing BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 
2000)). 
 22 Existence of these phenomena is manipulated by related actors, such as 
employers, who “value prestige as an independent good because it closely relates to 
individual self-esteem and employee morale.”  Andrew Cowan, Scarlet Letters for 
Corporations? Punishment by Publicity Under the New Sentencing Guidelines, 65 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 2387, 2401 (1992). 
 23 See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1, 7-10 (2002) [hereinafter Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement].   
2006] PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES 1465 
Perhaps best illustrating this scholarship is an analysis of 
litigants and their relative assessment of settlement and 
litigation.24  Litigants are said to value rational “aspirations,” 
which pertain to an “ideal target settlement sum, or set of 
terms,” and that guide litigants in negotiations.25  Conversely, a 
litigant’s “reservation price” comprises the least optimal value 
nevertheless sufficient for settlement.  For plaintiffs, the 
reservation price dictates the minimum amount worth 
accepting, while for defendants, it refers to the maximum 
amount worth paying.26  The area between these two 
reservation prices comprises the “bargaining zone,” and when 
the two parties fail to identify a figure within that zone, 
adjudication results.27  Accordingly, rational choice theory 
regards the achievement of settlement as entirely dependent 
upon agreement to share wealth, thereby rendering immaterial 
“blame” or feelings of “revenge” and “justice.”28  In essence, 
then, bargaining between litigants resembles any other form of 
bargaining between rational actors, and it is thus 
fundamentally indistinguishable from a manufacturer and 
supplier negotiating a sales contract or a sports team and 
player negotiating an employment contract.   
Of course, this rational approach to civil litigation 
depends upon the ability of litigants to identify their 
bargaining zone.  Indeed, rational choice theory surmises that 
litigants can determine the expected value of litigating, as well 
as the difference in transaction costs between out-of-court 
settlement and litigating.29  More concretely, as posited by 
rational choice theory, litigants equate the expected value of 
each prospective strategy to the probability of that strategy’s 
  
 24 Id. at 6 (describing the significance of rational choice theory in litigant 
behavioral assumptions). 
 25 Id. at 3. 
 26 HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 45 (1982); G. 
RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR 
REASONABLE PEOPLE 27 (1999) (on file with author). 
 27 See John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 
285 (1973); see also Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic 
Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 11 (1995) (identifying that parties will not settle when 
expected judgments exceed their expected costs).    
 28 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12-13 (1984); see also Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair 
Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. 
REV. 485, 520 (2003) (noting that scholars sometimes view settlement as “just a type of 
ex ante agreement, one that is ex ante relative to the final judgment”).  
 29 Priest & Klein, supra note 28, at 12. 
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success multiplied by its predictive monetary value.30  For 
instance, a litigant might conclude that expending 
extraordinary resources on discovery would increase the chance 
of victory, and that the value generated from that option would 
exceed the value generated by expending fewer resources on 
discovery but with diminished probability of victory.31   
In determining their bargaining zone, litigants—and 
their attorneys—must also account for rational choice decision-
making among judges.  Indeed, rational choice theorists 
surmise that trial judges consider the probability of reversal 
whenever ranking their preferences for case disposition.32  
Thus, in its application to litigant behavior, rational choice 
theory demands expansive knowledge from litigants in order to 
devise informed preferences.33 
Although application of rational choice theory most 
often concerns the pursuit of monetary wealth, “utility,” as 
noted in the preceding subsection, need not equate to monetary 
wealth.34  Indeed, individuals might place material value in 
measurable, but non-monetary characteristics, or intangible 
characteristics.35  Accordingly, rational decision-makers may 
rank preferences in line with non-monetary objectives, thus 
generating choices that optimally reflect those non-monetary 
preferences.   
To illustrate these “other” forms of utility, consider 
application of rational choice theory to decision-making among 
public actors.  For instance, rational choice theory assumes 
  
 30 See generally ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 20-40 (2003) (explaining how parties can use high discovery 
strategically to force settlements).  Thus, in practice, both litigants will value litigation 
based on the weighted average value of all potential outcomes.  See Korobkin, 
Aspirations and Settlement, supra note 23, at 7 (analyzing conclusions of Priest & 
Klein, supra note 28, at 29-30). 
 31 See David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and 
Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 407 n.35 (2000) (discussing “real world 
assumptions” about the relationship between investment in discovery and probability 
of success in litigation); see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 55-70 (1988) (discussing the theory of rational choice and expected 
monetary value); Shavell, supra note 27, at 11 (illuminating predictive roles of cost and 
benefit expectations among plaintiffs and defendants).  
 32 See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 
91 CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1483 (2003).  The idea of “rational” decision-making by judges 
has received substantial critique in recent years.  See generally Siegel, supra note 9 
(arguing that economic models fail to provide an accurate explanation of judicial 
decision-making). 
 33 See Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, supra note 23, at 7-9. 
 34 See discussion supra p. 1464. 
 35 See id. 
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that elected officials and, more broadly, those drawn to politics, 
place greatest value in amassing power.36  Consequently, 
political actors appear less interested in monetary wealth than 
is traditionally assumed by rational choice theory.37  Similar 
deductions have been made of government attorneys, whose 
primary self-interest, be it apparent power or civic duty, 
appears distinct from that of attorneys engaged in private 
practice.38 
The utility of these concepts can be further illustrated 
by observing the American workforce and opportunities for 
employment change.  Indeed, studies find that when workers 
anticipate an increase in either respect for their labor or 
positive feelings of camaraderie, they tend to evince diminished 
demand for tangible compensation.39  Alternatively constructed, 
by merely accepting an offer that features less monetary 
compensation than another offer, an individual implicitly 
posits a higher actual value from the chosen offer.40  This 
phenomenon is sometimes apparent when law firm partners 
have opportunities to become judges or law professors.  
Although such positions typically pay less in terms of monetary 
compensation, their relatively high prestige and potential for 
  
 36 James R. Buckley, The Political Economy of Superfund Implementation, 59 
S. CAL. L. REV. 875, 889 (1986) (concluding that “maximum wealth” for political actors 
includes power and job security). 
 37 Less admirably, rational choice theory also assumes that those drawn to 
politics are more interested in power than constituent representation or society’s best 
interests.  See MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON 
ESTABLISHMENT (1977). But see Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public 
Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 
1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 66 & n.303 (dismissing analysis that concludes that 
politicians are “for sale” as inconsistent with the history of tax law promulgation).  
 38 See Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or 
Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403, 454-56 (describing unique incentives 
and motivations of government attorneys); see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Reflections on Professional Responsibility in a Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1105, 1115-18 (1995) (reasoning that, due to an absence of private market 
constraints, government attorneys are more likely to pursue self-interests than are 
those attorneys engaged in private practice).    
 39 Katherine K. Yunker, Addressing the Real Problems for Law and 
Economics of Factoring Interest Rates, Earnings Growth and Inflation into Awards for 
Lost Future Earnings, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 23 n.57 (1994). 
 40 See Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other 
Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 771, 802 (1982) (“By accepting a low paying job in lieu of a higher 
paying one, an individual demonstrates that the total returns from the chosen 
position—monetary and nonmonetary—are valued more than those from the job not 
taken.”).  But see discussion of cognitive biases infra Part III.A. 
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intellectual flexibility often induce law firm partners into 
concluding that they are superior positions.41 
Neoclassical theory offers a useful corollary to 
employment opportunities in rational choice models.  It 
suggests that workers select employment opportunities that 
offer “preference-maximizing packages” of compensation, 
working conditions, and subjective characteristics.42  Similarly, 
neoclassical theory finds that individuals order their 
preferences depending upon value assessed to each 
preference.43  To illustrate, consider that when workers may 
determine their own hours of work before a change in wage 
rates, they often adjust their work hours to reflect their 
preferences for work and leisure.44  Accordingly, neoclassical 
theory reaffirms predictive characteristics apparent in the 
application of rational choice theory. 
III. RETHINKING RATIONAL CHOICE DECISION-MAKING 
A. Raising Doubts: Cognitive Biases 
Superficially, rational choice theory furnishes a useful 
tool for assessing why individuals make certain decisions.  
Upon further reflection, however, it appears limited by 
cognitive biases, which are subconscious mental processes that 
impair rational thought-processes and ultimately lead to 
“irrational” choices.  Such biases are prevalent among all 
  
 41 See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and 
Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 
1055 (1995) (noting that attorneys are often attracted to the position of judge because 
of its prestige and esteem); see also Kenneth F. Ripple, The Role of the Law Review in 
the Tradition of Judicial Scholarship, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 429, 434 (2000) 
(citing remarks by Justice Cardozo concerning the gradual rise in prestige of law 
professors in the legal world).  But see Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and 
Statistical Analysis of the Election Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 54 (wondering whether judges “exaggerate the value of their prestige to 
society”). Some positions, of course, offer both maximum prestige and financial 
recompense.  See A. Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate 
Failures, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 23 (2003) (noting that corporate directors often 
cite prestige and status associated with their occupation as meaningful).  
 42 Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace 
Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 828 
(1994). 
 43 See Ignacio de León, A Neo-Institutional Analysis of Vertical Integration 
and Its Implications for Antitrust Enforcement in Developing Countries, 26 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 251, 282 (2000). 
 44 Philip Harvey, Combating Joblessness: An Analysis of the Principal 
Strategies that Have Influenced the Development of American Employment and Social 
Welfare Law During the 20th Century, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 677, 721 (2000). 
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persons, and by simplifying the processing of information, often 
induce mental errors in deliberation of choice.45  To illustrate 
cognitive biases, consider that when individuals contemplate 
choice, many unknowingly distort the degree of risk or only 
selectively remember pertinent information.46  Furthermore, 
cognitive biases are distinct from other forms of biases (e.g., 
self-interest; ethnic or gender prejudice), as well as intellectual 
predispositions toward certain conclusions (e.g., conclusory 
analysis).  Instead, they reflect subliminal mental procedures 
for processing information. 
Since 1955, the role of cognitive biases in decision-
making processes has intrigued behavioral psychologists.  In 
that year, Herbert Simon published A Behavioral Model of 
Rational Choice, which proposed “replac[ing] the global 
rationality of economic man with a” model inclusive of “the 
computational capacities that are actually possessed by 
organisms, including man, in the kinds of environments in 
which such organisms exist.”47  Since that time, economists, 
legal scholars, and psychologists have evaluated the 
desirability of utilizing cognitive bias analysis in adjusting 
expectations for human behavior.  Such analysis has proven 
useful beyond the academic setting as well.  For instance, 
businesses routinely adjust marketing and client practices to 
accommodate for cognitive biases among customers and 
consumers.48  Likewise, policy analysts often qualify 
recommendations to account for potential biases among 
affected groups.49 
  
 45 See generally RICHARDS J. HEUER, JR., PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE 
ANALYSIS (1999) (observing effects of cognitive biases on decision-makers); Christine 
Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 
(1998). 
 46 See generally Michelle G. Craske & Deborah C. Pontillo, Cognitive Biases 
in Anxiety Disorders and Their Effect on Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment, 65 BULL. 
MENNINGER CLINIC 58 (2001).   
 47 See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. 
ECON. 99, 99 (1955).  
 48 See, e.g., MARKET PSYCHOL. CONSULTING, Money and Investing Personality 
Test,  http://www.marketpsych.com/simulations.php (last visited Jan. 4, 2006) 
(detailing how cognitive biases elicited from client bases can be exploited to generate 
profits). 
 49 See, e.g., Josh Kerbel (analyst in the Strategic Assessments Group in the 
Directorate of Intelligence), Thinking Straight: Cognitive Bias in the U.S. Debate About 
China, 48 STUD. IN INTELLIGENCE 1 (official journal of the Central Intelligence Agency) 
(2004), available at http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol48no3/article03.html (discussing 
role of cognitive biases in American perceptions of policy choices by China). 
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Numerous studies have illustrated the role of cognitive 
biases in decision-making processes.  Perhaps most heralded, 
consider the role of “framing effects” in shaping choice, and 
how they diminish assumed rationality among actors.  The 
most notable such study was conducted by Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky in 1984.  It revealed how individuals 
respond varyingly to two identical outcomes worded slightly 
differently.50  Specifically, the authors found that when 
individuals are presented with a hypothetical choice on how to 
dispense finite medical care to 600 persons afflicted with a fatal 
disease, with one choice resulting in 200 people being saved, 
and the other resulting in 400 people dying, they are less likely 
to endorse a policy where “400 people will die” than one where 
“200 people will be saved.”51  Such a conclusion contradicts the 
rational choice model, since a rational actor would make the 
same choice regardless of its description.52  Framing effects of 
these kinds have been found in other settings as well, and they 
diminish the certainty of rational choice predictions.53  Along 
those lines, framing effects belie the rational choice assumption 
that choices reflect a maximization of utility or relative 
strength of preferences, as such choices instead appear 
modifiable by unappreciated factors, such as wording of 
questions and other circumstances.54  
Similarly, consider the effect of confirmation bias, 
whereby individuals are subject to ignore or discount 
information that challenges existing beliefs.55  Confirmation 
bias is especially prevalent among those who are overconfident, 
  
 50 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 343 (1984). 
 51 Id.  
 52 See David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O’Shea, Can Law and Economics Be 
Both Practical and Principled?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 361 (2002) (describing how 
rational actor theory presumes that individuals rank outcomes with identical outcomes 
as equal, and thus would not prefer one option over the other).   
 53 See Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 16, 
at 644-46 (discussing use of framing effects by exploitative industry actors). 
 54 See Hoffman & O’Shea, supra note 52, at 361. 
 55 See Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 16, 
at 647-50.  A corollary to confirmation bias is “self-serving” or “egocentric” biases, 
whereby individuals “interpret information in a way that disproportionately favors 
their own position.” Unlike confirmation bias, however, self-serving or egocentric biases 
are likely consciously present.  Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A 
Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 206 n.199 (2000) [hereinafter Guthrie, 
Framing Frivolous Litigation] (noting that these biases may increase plaintiffs’ risk in 
seeking frivolous litigation). See generally Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, 
Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 
109 (1997) (discussing the impact of self-serving biases on settlements). 
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and it frequently leads to “irrational” decision-making.56  For 
instance, when business or policy managers discuss strategic 
planning, they often avoid consideration of worst-case 
scenarios, as well as refrain from consulting with “Devil’s 
advocates” among their group of advisors.57  Confirmation bias 
also affects how employers regard individual employees.  
Indeed, as soon as a manager develops reservations about an 
employee’s competence, the manager often becomes prone to 
negatively interpret confusing or ambiguous circumstances 
concerning that employee, while attributing positives 
circumstances to luck, coincidence, or someone else’s 
assistance.58  Also consider confirmation bias in the law 
enforcement setting: When police investigators believe they 
have identified the guilty party within a police lineup, they 
tend to ask eyewitnesses specifically about that person while 
not asking those same questions about others in the lineup.59 
Optimism bias has likewise received scholarly attention 
as disturbing traditional assumptions among rational choice 
theorists.  The concept posits that individuals assume that 
general risks “do not apply with equal force to themselves.”60  
Put differently, optimism bias is “the belief that good things 
are more likely than average to happen to us and bad things 
  
 56 See John Kelly, Putting Investors on the Couch; With Equity Prices Having 
Fallen, Now Would Be a Good Time for Investors to Reappraise Their Portfolios, but 
Why Are So Few Actually Doing So?, INVESTMENT ADVISER, Mar. 24, 2003, available at 
www.lexis.com (search “News, All (English, Full Text)” for full title in quotes) (noting 
need for investment advisors to counter confirmation biases particularly among those 
overconfident investors). 
 57 See Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate 
Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1394 n.146 (2002). 
 58 Jean-Louis Barsoux & Jean-Francois Manzoni, The Downward Spiral, FIN. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2002, at 6. 
 59 See Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: 
Psychological Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 765, 
767 (1995).  Academic studies present another area where confirmation biases often 
emerge, as researchers tend to discount conflicting data discovered after conclusions 
have been made.  See Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, Addressing Disturbing and 
Disturbed Consumer Behavior: Is It Necessary to Change the Way We Conduct 
Behavioral Science?, 33 J. MKTG. RES. 1, 5 (1996); see also Hans Baumgartner, On the 
Utility of Consumers’ Theories in Judgments of Covariation, 21 J. CONSUMER RES. 634, 
638 (1995) (discussing existence of confirmation bias during process of data sampling 
by academic researchers). 
 60 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some 
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1511 (1999) [hereinafter 
Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence of Market Manipulation]; see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, 
The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 216 (1995) 
(finding that “as a systematic matter, people are unrealistically optimistic”). 
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are less likely than average to happen to us.”61  Most 
illustratively, because of optimism bias, the average American 
estimates a one in five chance of personally being the victim of 
a non-terrorist violent crime, yet believes that the average 
American has about a two in five chance of being one.62  
Alternatively, consider that smokers are inclined to perceive 
smoking as significantly less risky for themselves than for 
other smokers.63  Indeed, optimism bias tends to flourish when 
risks are long-term, or are presumed modifiable through 
behavior.64  For that reason, when consumers assume that 
signs of toxicity will appear early in product usage, they tend to 
then assume that an absence of such signs foretells exemption 
from future risk.65   
Individuals are also distracted by irrelevant third 
options when making decisions.  These options most often 
emerge in the consumer context.  For instance, automobile 
manufacturers routinely make a particular model “appear less 
expensive by adding a higher-priced option to the product 
line.”66  Similarly, manufacturers of “risky” products, such as 
unfiltered cigarettes or untested dietary supplements, tend to 
  
 61 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 15, at 1091. 
 62 See Neal R. Feigenson, Emotions, Risk Perceptions and Blaming in 9/11 
Cases, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 959, 981 n.82 (2003) (citing Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Effects 
of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment, 14 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 144, 149 (2003), available at http://www.hss.cmu.edu/ 
departments/sds/faculty/Lerner/EffectsOfFearAndAngerOnPerc.pdf. 
 63 See William B. Hansen & C. Kevin Malotte, Perceived Personal Immunity: 
The Development of Beliefs About Susceptibility to the Consequences of Smoking, 15 
PREVENTIVE MED. 363, 370-71 (1986); see also Suzanne C. Segerstrom et al., Optimistic 
Bias Among Cigarette Smokers, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1606, 1614-17 (1993).  
But see W. Kip Viscusi, Constructive Cigarette Regulation, 47 DUKE L.J. 1095, 1113-14 
(1998) (presenting evidence that optimism bias is unsupported in the context of 
cigarette smoking, as “research on adolescents fails to indicate any significant 
difference between risks to oneself and one’s peers”). 
 64 See Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 16, 
at 657 & nn.106-09; see also Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life 
Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1980) (presenting evidence that 
individuals ascribe to “unrealistic optimism”). 
 65 Paul Slovic, Do Adolescent Smokers Know the Risks?, 47 DUKE L.J. 1133, 
1137 (1998).  Along those lines, optimism bias may prove most pronounced among 
children smokers, who often rate their own chances of contracting lung disease as 
nearly identical to those of non-smokers.  See Jonathan D. Reppucci et al., Unrealistic 
Optimism Among Adolescent Smokers and Nonsmokers, 11 J. PRIMARY PREVENTION 
227, 235 (1991); see also Michael A. McCann, Dietary Supplement Labeling: Cognitive 
Biases, Market Manipulation & Consumer Choice, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 215, 223-27 
(2005) [hereinafter McCann, Dietary Supplement Labeling] (discussing optimism bias 
among consumers of dietary supplements and how supplement manufacturers may 
exploit such a bias). 
 66 Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, supra note 60, 
at 1440 (discussing irrelevant third options in context of used car sales).  
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adroitly frame the choice between something dangerous (e.g., 
regular cigarettes; supplements containing ephedra), 
something much less risky (e.g., “unfiltered cigarettes”; 
“ephedra-free supplements”), and no action at all.  In doing so, 
they encourage continued usage from would-be quitters, as the 
individual becomes biased in favor of options that he originally 
disfavored.67  
Also consider the salience of irrelevant third options in 
disturbing the presumed stability of ranked preferences within 
the rational actor model.  For instance, when an individual is 
presented with a small or large box of popcorn, she might 
choose the small.  That same consumer, however, would more 
likely choose the large box when also presented with the option 
of an extra large box.68  As noted by Richard Thaler, if actors 
were entirely rational in their deliberation of choice, and thus 
possessed stable options, then the presence of an extraneous 
choice, like an extra large box, would not affect the choice 
between a small and large box.69  Yet it does.70   
Informational deficiencies and time constraints likewise 
inhibit strategic and rational decision-making, and they 
encourage individuals to make inferences from small sample 
sizes.  For instance, law enforcement officers, who are uniquely 
taxed for time and expected to promptly solve cases, regularly 
make conclusive judgments of guilt on the basis of only one or 
two witness interviews.71  Similarly, consider trial judges, who, 
in contemplating judgment, often consider the probability of 
appeal.72  Rational actor analysis maintains that such 
consideration should compel judges to rank potential outcomes 
(e.g., appellate reversal; appellate remand) associated with 
  
 67 Id. at 1515 (discussing irrelevant third options in context of cigarettes); see 
also McCann, Dietary Supplement Labeling, supra note 65, at 224 & 226 (discussing 
irrelevant third options in the context of dietary supplements). 
 68 Daniel T. Ostas, Deconstructing Corporate Social Responsibility: Insights 
from Legal and Economic Theory, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 261, 294 (2001). 
 69 See generally RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 42 (1991). 
 70 Ostas, supra note 68, at 294.  See Roger Mason, Interpersonal Effects on 
Consumer Demand in Economic Theory and Marketing Thought, 1890-1950, 25 J. 
ECON. ISSUES 871 (1995) (finding that marketing schemes often construct, rather than 
react to consumer interests).  
 71 See Wells & Seelau, supra note 59, at 767 (explaining how law enforcement 
officers tend to make “strong judgments of validity on the basis of only one 
eyewitness”); see also Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of 
Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1709-10 (2003) (assessing 
cognitive biases experienced by witnesses while being interviewed by police). 
 72 See discussion supra p. 1465 and accompanying notes. 
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possible trial choices (e.g., motion denied; motion sustained).73  
Trial judges, however, often encounter time constraints, heavy 
workloads, and uncertain information that may impair any 
strategic value in pursuing these preferences.74  Legal scholars 
have observed that in order for judges to accurately discount 
the corresponding probability of reversal for each preference, 
they would have to possess information concerning the 
probability of appeal and settlement, as well as knowledge of 
precise preferences embraced by the relevant appellant 
judges.75  Thus, in the absence of such information, “rational” 
decision-making appears more like guesswork and conjecture. 
Cognitive biases may also affect retrospective 
assessment of choice.  This is especially apparent with 
hindsight bias, which refers to the tendency of individuals to 
overestimate the extent to which they anticipated the fruition 
of a particular event.76  Put differently, individuals often believe 
that they knew something was going to happen when in fact 
they did not.77  This phenomenon is especially apparent when 
interviewing those prior and after a particular event.  For 
instance, when voters are asked to project the outcome of an 
imminent election, and are later asked to remember their 
choice, far more claim to have predicted the correct outcome 
than actually did.78  Similarly, when individuals are asked to 
  
 73 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 
51 SMU L. REV. 469, 492 (1998). 
 74 Cross, supra note 32, at 1485; see also Susan P. Koniak & George M. 
Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1124-25 (1996) (describing 
indifference of the public and politicians to insistence by trial judges of onerous 
workloads and corresponding diminution of quality of judging); Jeffrey A. Parness & 
Matthew R. Walker, Thinking Outside the Civil Case Box: Reformulating Pretrial 
Conference Laws, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 347, 363 (2002) (identifying time pressures as 
observed by Judge Richard Posner).  
 75 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the 
D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1767-68 n.103 (1997) (describing immense complexity 
of predicting reversals on statutory grounds); see also DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN 
THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 14 (2002) (illuminating obstacles for trial 
judges attempting to forecast probability of appeal success).  
 76 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against 
Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 328-29 (1998). 
 77 See, e.g., Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of 
Past Events After the Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 311-12 (1990); 
Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on 
Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. HUM. PERCEPTION & 
PERFORMANCE 288, 288 (1975) (first describing the effect).  
 78 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in 
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 577 (1998). Similar findings have pertained to 
subjects who are asked to predict whether a business would be successful, with subjects 
claiming “I predicted it” at a higher rate than actually did.  Clifton E. Brown & Ira 
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predict whether a particular line of products will succeed, an 
artificially high percentage will later claim to have identified 
the correct outcome.79  Significantly, by distorting individuals’ 
capacity to objectively evaluate their decision-making and 
pursuit of preferences, hindsight bias limits the potential for 
ameliorative redress of any other cognitive biases. 
Regret aversion, or the tendency to avoid feedback on 
forgone conclusions, only exacerbates hindsight bias.80  Such 
aversion encourages individuals to shield themselves from 
discovering “what might have been” had they pursued 
alternative choices.81  Individuals experiencing regret aversion 
are similarly averse to comparisons with imagined outcomes, 
which may likewise promote sadness or regret.82  Accordingly, 
both hindsight bias and regret aversion discourage 
retrospective analysis of decision-making.  Empirical data 
corroborates this idea.  Indeed, regret aversion has been found 
to influence consumer purchase decisions,83 investor 
preferences,84 physician choice of care,85 and, most recently, 
litigant behavior.86 
Importantly, in light of the aforementioned cognitive 
biases, ostensibly objective measures, such as “market value” 
and “fair compensation,” may reflect irrational cognitive biases 
  
Solomon, Effects of Outcome Information on Evaluations of Managerial Decisions, 62 
ACCT. REV. 564, 568-75 (1987). 
 79 Brown & Solomon, supra note 78, at 570-73. 
 80 See Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of 
Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 43 [hereinafter Guthrie, Better Settle Than 
Sorry]. 
 81 See David S. Boninger, Faith Gleicher & Alan Strathman, Counterfactual 
Thinking: From What Might Have Been to What May Be, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 297, 297 (1994); see also Richard P. Larrick, Motivational Factors in Decision 
Theories: The Role of Self-Protection, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 440, 445 (1993) (describing 
behavioral predilections commonly associated with avoidance of risk). 
 82 See Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry, supra note 80, at 69-70 & n.133 
(citing conclusions in Marcel Zeelenberg et al., Consequences of Regret Aversion: Effects 
of Expected Feedback on Risky Decision Making, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 148, 149 (1996)). 
 83 J. Jeffrey Inman & Leigh McAlister, Do Coupon Expiration Dates Affect 
Consumer Behavior?, 31 J. MARKETING RES. 423, 423 (1994) (reasoning that 
anticipated regret may account for the increase in consumer coupon redemption 
behavior prior to coupon expiration dates). 
 84 Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law 
from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. 
L. REV. 627, 652-53 (1996). 
 85 See Cheryl B. Travis et al., Judgment Heuristics and Medical Decisions, 13 
PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 211, 215 (1989) (proposing regret theory as one possible 
explanation for clinical treatment decisions). 
 86 Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry, supra note 80, at 72-79. 
1476 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:4 
as much as any rational bargaining.  As a result, individual 
preferences may only partially account for market 
determinations, such as the “going-rate” for a particular type of 
worker (e.g., a talented chief executive officer; a 20-game 
winner in Major League Baseball).87  Indeed, for that very 
reason, Cass Sunstein maintains that rational choice models 
are “often wrong in the simple sense that they yield inaccurate 
predictions.”88  Similarly, Russell Korobkin and Thomas Ulen 
find that “individuals are systematically biased in their 
predictions of the probable results of various events89 . . . they 
frequently act in ways that are incompatible with the 
assumptions of rational choice theory.”90 
B. Raising Doubts: Heuristics 
The failure of rational choice theory to absorb cognitive 
biases invites discussion of further cognitive limitations, 
namely human tendencies to incorporate rules of thumb into 
their decision-making processes.  These “rules of thumb” are 
also known as heuristic devices or heuristics, which are 
convenient, if unfinished methods to process information.91  
Such devices emerge primarily because of processing devices 
within the human brain that seek to conserve scarce 
resources.92  These devices allow the brain to manage a complex 
array of stimuli through shortcuts, largely based on predictive 
probability.93  
Heuristics, however, exhibit a tendency to encourage 
decisions based on illusions, or distorted perceptions.94  For 
instance, heuristics may lead individuals to exaggerate health 
  
 87 Hoffman & O’Shea, supra note 52, at 361. 
 88 Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1175 (1997). 
 89 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 15, at 1085. 
 90 Id. at 1055. 
 91 See Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 
3 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). 
 92 Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the 
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. 
PA. L. REV. 129, 137 (2003). 
 93 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or 
Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 61 (2000).  See Samuel Issacharoff, The Content of Our 
Casebooks: Why Do Cases Get Litigated?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1265, 1275 (2002) 
(describing these phenomena in choices among individuals to seek litigation). 
 94  Rachlinski, supra note 93, at 61. 
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ailments,95 particularly when those individuals are unable to 
measure the presence of actual risk.96  Moreover, the human 
mind tends to minimize the role of complexifying context (e.g., 
background factors; situational pressures) and accentuate the 
role of salient behavior (e.g., expressed words; physical 
manifestations).97  For that reason, individuals tend to 
attribute another person’s behavior to her own dispositional 
qualities, rather than to circumstances or situational factors.98  
The attribution of behavior to disposition rather than 
circumstances is considered part of a broader defect called the 
“fundamental attribution error,” and heuristics can evince its 
effect.99 
Heuristics can also adversely influence negotiations.  
This is especially apparent with “anchoring and adjustment” 
effects, whereby a negotiator begins with a presumptively 
rational reference point, but then fails to adjust adequately for 
new information.100  Psychologists sometimes describe this 
effect as “belief perseverance,” or the tendency to cling to a 
viewpoint in the face of disconfirming evidence.101  For instance, 
a professional athlete negotiating a contract might estimate his 
market value based on a contract earned by a similar player.102  
He might then adjust that figure based on perceived variances 
between himself and the similar player, such as age, 
experience, and injury-history.103  Although such an approach 
  
 95 See Robert A. McNutt et al., Patient Safety Efforts Should Focus on 
Medical Errors, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1997, 2001 (2002); see also Stephen B. Soumerai 
et al., Effect of Local Medical Opinion Leaders on Quality of Care for Acute Myocardial 
Infarction: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 279 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1358, 1363 (1998) 
(discussing the salience of heuristics in the context of acute myocardial infarctions). 
 96 See Sidney T. Bogardus, Jr., Eric Holmboe & James F. Jekel, Perils, 
Pitfalls, and Possibilities in Talking About Medical Risk, 281 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1037, 
1041 (1999) (noting that people frequently utilize heuristic guides to counter difficulties 
in understanding risk). 
 97 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 92, at 137. 
 98 See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 67-86 (2d ed. 
1991). 
 99 For an extensive analysis of the fundamental attribution error, see Jon 
Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on 
the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004).  
 100 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128 (1974). 
 101 See Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 16, 
at 652-53. 
 102 See Donald Fehr, Union Views Concerning Agents: With Commentary on 
the Present Situation in Major League Baseball, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 71, 79 (1993). 
 103 See Michael A. McCann, Illegal Defense: The Irrational Economics of 
Banning High School Players from the NBA Draft, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 113, 169-
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might appear sensible, studies find that individuals often fail 
to adjust sufficiently away from the initial anchor.104  Indeed, 
even in the absence of anchor-affirming information, 
individuals exhibit a natural reluctance to alter anchors.105  
Consequently, the professional athlete might modify the 
anchor, but in a way that insufficiently reflects actual 
variations between himself and the similar player.  Such 
phenomena are notable in other fields as well.  For instance, in 
litigation, the opening offer in a settlement negotiation can 
influence the recipient’s judgment of a subsequent final offer, 
even when the opening offer does not convey relevant 
information.106 
Likewise influential are “endowment effects,” whereby 
individuals perceive more utility from their current state of 
affairs than from altered and equivalent circumstances.107  As a 
consequence, individuals often demand more to relinquish an 
item than they would pay to obtain that same item.108  For 
instance, Kahneman and Tversky find that when individuals 
are hypothetically assigned one of two jobs, the first with a 
higher salary and the second with better working conditions, 
they prefer to remain in their assigned job rather than switch, 
  
72 [hereinafter McCann, Illegal Defense] (discussing impact of age and experience on 
contract negotiations in the NBA). 
 104 See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the 
Bargaining Table, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 795, 799 (2004). 
 105 See Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant: 
Anchors in Judgments of Belief and Value, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 130-33 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); see 
also Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, Putting Adjustment Back in the Anchoring and 
Adjustment Heuristic, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 391 (2001) (discussing reluctance of individuals 
to move away from initial anchors). 
 106 See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Opening Offers and Out-of-Court 
Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go a Long Way, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 1, 11-13, 18-19 (1994).  Anchoring and adjustment has also been illustrated by 
utilizing different reference points in questioning.  See, e.g., Edward J. Joyce & Gary C. 
Biddle, Anchoring and Adjustment in Probabilistic Inference in Auditing, 19 J. ACCT. 
RES. 120, 122-23 (1981) (illustrating how individuals’ estimation of the likelihood of 
corporate fraud varies significantly based on the phrasing of the question). 
 107 See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 104, at 802-03; see also Daniel 
Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 
98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (supplying findings that confirm the prevalence of 
endowment heuristics); Russell Korobkin, Policymaking and the Offer/Asking Price 
Gap: Toward a Theory of Efficient Entitlement Allocation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 663, 668-69 
(1994) (discussing endowment heuristics in the context of negotiations).  
 108 See generally Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003) (describing and suggesting strategies for the integration 
of endowment effect into legal analysis). 
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regardless of which job they are assigned.109  Similar findings 
are evident in the investment context: individuals prefer to 
maintain existing investment instruments (e.g., stocks; bonds) 
and their levels of investment, regardless of the instrument 
type or investment level.110  Further, when negotiating 
contracts, individuals often prefer terms of trade that are 
conventional and generally accepted, simply because they are 
familiar.111 
Correspondingly, consider myopic heuristics, which 
encourage individuals to “stay the course,” even when doing so 
would diminish their long-term welfare.112  This in part relates 
to the human tendency to be more concerned about losses than 
gains, and thus more averse to risk of loss than tempted by 
potential gain.113  For instance, even in the presence of 
conflicting evidence, shareholders often myopically view 
earnings reports to assume that short-term earnings are likely 
to continue indefinitely.114  Myopic heuristics also pertain to 
systematic over-estimation of costs inherent in change, such as 
time, thinking, and soliciting advice.115  To illustrate, consider 
that individuals often dismiss future environmental concerns 
because they are dissuaded by the complexity of the related 
literature, as well as the requisite effort to overcome such 
complexity.116 
  
 109 Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 50, at 348; see also Russell Korobkin, 
The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 627 (1998) 
(discussing Kahneman & Tversky and related studies). 
 110 See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in 
Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 14 (1988) (studying MBA students at 
Boston University and public policy graduate students at Harvard University). 
 111 Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The 
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1587-88 
(1998). 
 112 Jolls et al., supra note 45, at 1479 (describing “bounded willpower” and its 
effect on human choices); see also Erik Luna, Race, Crime, and Institutional Design, 66 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 183, 197 (2003) (discussing myopic heuristics in context of 
criminal law). 
 113 Behavioral Finance: Borrowing from Psychology to Explain Behavior, 
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, May 26, 1997, at 32 (discussing myopic risk aversion in 
context of investment strategies). 
 114 See Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing 
Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1102 (1990) (explaining 
how management might exploit this behavioral pattern among shareholders to present 
short-term earnings in a more favorable light by under-investing in research and 
development and other long-term projects). 
 115 John R. Hauser et al., How Consumers Allocate Their Time When 
Searching for Information, 30 J. MARKETING RES. 452, 458 (1993).  
 116 See U.S. Rep. Earl Blumenauer, Entrepreneurial Environmentalism: A 
New Approach for the New Millennium, 30 ENVTL. L. 1, 5 (2000) (observing that 
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A more encompassing heuristic pertains to the human 
tendency to arrive at conclusions that they are motivated to 
reach.117  Indeed, motivation to achieve a certain conclusion 
often induces the mind to form impressions, evaluate 
observations, and make decisions pursuant to such 
motivation.118  The most salient of these motivations is the 
desire to see oneself in “self-affirming ways.”119  That is, people 
tend to view themselves as harboring good intentions and 
acting in accordance with moral norms.120  To ensure 
preservation of such selective views, individuals routinely 
make dramatic cognitive adjustments, including complete 
shielding of conflicting information.121  These adjustments are 
especially telling when individuals are confronted with 
challenging philosophical choices, such as participation in war 
crimes.122 
Like cognitive biases then, heuristics may lead to 
systemic errors, as judgments about how to best respond to 
choice and circumstances can unknowingly discount 
meaningful data.123  Taken together, biases and heuristics 
reveal significant limits to the rational actor model, and 
suggest that individuals may unknowingly pursue less-than-
preferable course of actions.  These deleterious tendencies are 
only accentuated by individuals’ vast and systematic under-
appreciation of their capacity to utilize and be manipulated by 
  
“[c]omprehensive environmental approaches are too often laid aside as overly complex 
or even impossible to implement”); see also Rebecca M. Bratspies, Myths of Voluntary 
Compliance: Lessons from the StarLink Corn Fiasco, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 593, 642 (2003) (discussing difficulty of understanding environmental regulation); 
Edward R. Morrison, Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1333, 1346-47 (1998) (describing environmental 
regulation as an example of a topic where its complexity tends to dissuade inquiry). 
 117 Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 92, at 138. 
 118 Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 
480 (1990). 
 119 Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 92, at 138. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, Broken Scales: Obesity and 
Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645, 1659 (2004); see also Abhijit Biswas et al., 
Consumer Evaluation of Reference Price Advertisements: Effects of Other Brands’ Prices 
and Semantic Cues, 18 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 52 (1999) (describing how consumers 
make cognitive adjustments in value judgments). 
 122 See Eddie Harmon-Jones & Cindy Harmon-Jones, Testing the Action-Based 
Model of Cognitive Dissonance: The Effect of Action Orientation on Postdecisional 
Attitudes, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 711, 719-21 (2002) (presenting 
subjects with varying difficulties of decisions and assessing results). 
 123 See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1178 (1997). 
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cognitive distortions.124  As a result, there often exists a 
considerable gap between an individual’s set of preferences and 
her pattern of choices, thus undermining the very premise 
behind rational choice theory. 
Nevertheless, the alleged effects of cognitive biases, 
heuristics, and, more broadly, behavioral decision theory are 
not without critique.  One of the most often cited critiques 
suggests that while individuals may display cognitive errors in 
laboratory or controlled experiments, they may act more 
rationally in real world settings.125  There are also doubts as to 
how well cognitive biases and heuristics predict anomalous 
behavior, or how well such techniques forecast response to 
policy shifts or circumstantial changes.126  In the context of 
professional athletes contemplating contractual offers, the 
following section will assess the relative strengths and 
limitations of rational choice models and competing cognitive 
influences. 
IV. PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES & CONTRACTUAL DECISION-
MAKING 
A. Relevance to the Study of Law and Economics and 
Behavioral Sciences 
The potential influence of alternative preferences and 
cognitive biases on professional athletes is, to date, an 
unexplored topic.  Perhaps this is not surprising, since 
professional athletes comprise less than one-tenth of one 
percent of the population and are thus considered a 
statistically-insignificant population segment by most 
demographers.127  Moreover, with their often exorbitant 
salaries, generous work schedules, and glamorous lifestyles, 
professional athletes tend to be considered extraordinarily 
  
 124 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 92, at 138. 
 125 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits 
of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 551 & n.18 (2003) (doubting existence of heuristics 
and cognitive biases in contract law); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing 
Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1661 (2003). 
 126 See, e.g., Jessica L. Cohen & William T. Dickens, A Foundation for 
Behavioral Economics, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 335, 335 (2002). 
 127 See, e.g., Fares al-Braizat, Muslims and Democracy: An Empirical Critique 
of Fukuyama’s Culturalist Approach, 43 INT’L J. COMP. SOC. 269 (2002), available at 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/Upload/5_Islamdem_2.pdf (describing as 
“insignificant” a population that comprises less than one percent of the total 
population).  
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unique and sufficiently incomparable to more socially-relevant 
populations.128  Perhaps for these very reasons, professional 
athletes have warranted relatively scant consideration by legal 
academics.129  Other reasons for their academic marooning 
include a more than occasional dismissal of sports law as a 
frivolous area of study,130 as well as sports law’s only recent 
ascendancy in legal academia.131  
Overlooking professional athletes, however, appears to 
be a disservice to the study of behavioral law and economics.  
Indeed, although a comparatively small group, professional 
athletes appear strikingly influential on the world around 
them.  Most notably, professional athletes play on teams which 
supply tangible economic benefit to local communities, 
including the generation of employment opportunities for 
vendors, concessionaires, security, and other ameliorated 
groups, as well as the boosting of sales for adjoining businesses, 
such as restaurants, pubs, and hotels.132  Also consider the 
  
 128 See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 255-57 (1996) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (highlighting the unique economic position of professional athletes); Dan 
Messeloff, The NBA’s Deal with the Devil: The Antitrust Implications of the 1999 NBA-
NBPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
521, 532 (2000) (quoting NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION UNIFORM PLAYER 
CONTRACT, ¶ 9) (explaining how the “extraordinary and unique skill and ability” of 
professional athletes renders them sufficiently distinct from other population groups 
considered by the law); Eric D. Scheible, No Runs. No Hits. One Error: Eliminating 
Major League Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption Will Not Save the Game, 73 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 73, 100 n.209 (1995) (describing unique nature of professional athlete in 
the labor market, and implying how that nature might make legal comparison more 
challenging and less predictable).  
 129 Timothy Davis, What Is Sports Law?, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 211, 212 
(2001) (noting that many legal academics believe that analysis of sports does not 
warrant academic attention). 
 130 See, e.g., James R. Elkins, Troubled Beginnings: Reflections on Becoming a 
Lawyer, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1303, 1311 (1996) (quoting JOHN GRISHAM, THE 
RAINMAKER (1996)). 
 131 See Roger I. Abrams, Book Review, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1237, 1238 (1986) 
(describing how sports law became popular in the late 1980s, following growth of the 
modern sports industry).  In fact, since the 1990s, a number of law schools, including 
Tulane Law School and Marquette University Law School, offer certificates in sports 
law.  Larry Cata Backer, Toward General Principles of Academic Specialization by 
Means of Certificate or Concentration Programs: Creating a Certificate Program in 
International, Comparative and Foreign Law at Penn State, 20 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 
67, 117 n.115 (2001).  See http://www.law.tulane.edu (follow links to “Programs of 
Study” and “Sports Law”) (last visited Jan. 25, 2006).  In contrast to many legal 
scholars, economists have tended to regard professional sports as a useful vehicle from 
which to examine a range of theoretical issues.  See, e.g., J. Colin H. Jones et al., 
Ethnicity, Productivity and Salary: Player Compensation and Discrimination in the 
National Hockey League, 31 APPLIED ECON. 593, 594 (1999) (discussing role of 
professional sports in economic research).  
 132 See generally KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, THE SPORTS FRANCHISE GAME 
(1995) (claiming that sports teams provide a multiplier effect on local economies); 
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capacity of professional sports to effect meaningful broadcast 
revenue: the television contracts of the four largest leagues (the 
National Football League (“NFL”), Major League Baseball 
(“MLB”), the National Basketball Association (“NBA”), and the 
National Hockey League (“NHL”)) collectively exceed $4 billion 
annually.133  More subjectively, professional athletes supply 
appreciable, though intangible benefit to their surrounding 
communities, often in the form of team pride or simply the 
enabling of fandom and associated enjoyment.134 
Perhaps more importantly, and unlike most population 
groups, professional athletes furnish published commentary of 
their thought processes, as evidenced by regular newspaper, 
television, and radio interviews.  Moreover, burgeoning player-
to-fan discussions, such as chat rooms or blogs, offer 
supplemental avenues for players to explain their decision-
making processes.135  Further commentary is provided by the 
media, players’ agents, team executives, and a myriad of 
“insiders.”136  In short, there exists a wealth of statements by 
  
SPORTS, JOBS & TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS (Roger 
G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997) (arguing that sports teams create jobs, boost 
tourism, and decrease crime).  But see MARK ROSENTRAUB, MAJOR LEAGUE LOSERS: 
THE REAL COSTS OF SPORTS AND WHO’S PAYING FOR IT (2001) (on file with author) 
(dismissing the benefit of sports franchises on the local economy as miniscule); PAUL C. 
WEILER, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: HOW THE LAW CAN MAKE SPORTS BETTER FOR 
FANS 267-69 (2000) (equating a publicly-financed stadium to a public park that charges 
expensive admission); Dale F. Rubin, Public Aid to Professional Sports Teams—A 
Constitutional Disgrace.  The Battle to Revive Judicial Rulings and State 
Constitutional Enactments Prohibiting Public Subsidies to Private Corporations, 30 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 393, 418 (1999) (arguing against public finance for professional sports 
franchises due to lack of credible evidence such financing ultimately yields greater 
benefit than cost). 
 133 See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, 
CASES, PROBLEMS 389 (2d ed. 1998). 
 134 See WEILER, supra note 132, at 170 (observing that sports fans follow their 
favorite teams and players similar to religious followers); see also Bruce W. Burton & 
Matthew J. Mitten, New Remedies for Breach of Sports Facility Use Agreements: Time 
for Marketplace Realism, 88 IOWA L. REV. 809, 820 n.37 (2003) (illuminating 
psychological benefits identified by sports fans).   
 135 Some players, such as Red Sox pitcher Curt Schilling, regularly utilize chat 
rooms to post their thoughts.  Daniel G. Habib, Down to the Last Out, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 27, 2004, at Z8 (noting how Schilling regularly posts on the “Sons 
of Sam Horn” message board, which is primarily comprised of devoted Red Sox fans); 
see also Howard Bryant, Schilling’s Off Line, BOSTON HERALD, June 15, 2004, at 90 
(criticizing Schilling for communicating his feelings directly through Sons of Sam Horn 
while refusing to discuss those feelings with reporters). 
 136 Such insiders even include player wives.  See Steven M. Ortiz, The 
Ethnographic Process of Gender Management: Doing the “Right” Masculinity with 
Wives of Professional Athletes, 11 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 265, 273 (2005) (interviewing 
players’ wives regarding their husbands’ choices in both the personal and professional 
arena).  
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athletes and those close to them that attest to their values, 
beliefs, and priorities when deciding where, and for how much 
they want to play, among other choices.  Accordingly, 
professional athletes illuminate real world behavioral patterns, 
rather than stimuli to experimental circumstances, and, in 
doing so, abrogate the alleged “experimental flaw” of many 
behavioral law and economic studies.137 
Thus, exploring the decision-making processes of 
professional athletes in the context of employment 
opportunities may prove not only to be an engaging exercise, 
but an instrumental analysis of behavioral tendencies in real-
world settings.  This Article will now turn to this exploration, 
and will begin with a discussion of contracting and choice 
among professional athletes.  Subsequently, it will canvass 
actual players who accepted the “less-than-optimal” contract 
offers, assuming optimality is defined as the most lucrative 
offer.  In doing so, this Article will address whether their 
choices reflected conscious preferences, such as desire to be 
close to home or partiality to warm weather, or cognitive biases 
and heuristics that went unappreciated in their decision-
making processes.   
B. Exploring Contract Negotiations Between Player, Agent 
& Team 
Like film actors, musicians, and other high-paid, 
service-oriented professionals, professional athletes enter into 
personal services contracts that reflect their unique skills or 
talents.138  In the case of professional athletes, those unique 
skills or talents comprise the exceedingly rare ability to 
athletically perform in a way that attracts financial 
remuneration.139  As a result, their “employment” with 
professional sports teams entails their “execution of personal 
services contract[s] with the owner or prospective owner of a 
  
 137 See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 138 See M. Scott McDonald, Noncompete Contracts: Understanding the Cost of 
Unpredictability, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 137, 143 (2003). 
 139 To illustrate how exceedingly rare it is for an athlete to ever earn income 
playing sports, consider that “[o]nly 3 out of every 10,000 boys who play high school 
basketball ever make it to the pros,” and “[o]nly 1 out of every 75 college players ever 
makes the jump to the big time.”  Fred Bowen, Going Pro: It’s a Long Shot, WASH. 
POST, June 29, 2001, at C12 (citing research conducted by the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA)).  Also consider that less than one percent of high school 
athletes receive college athletic scholarships.  Tony Hansen, Havin’ a Ball at Camp, 
BATTLE CREEK ENQUIRER, May 26, 2004, at 1B. 
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professional sports team for the purpose of future athletic 
services.”140   
Typically, players’ contracts are negotiated by their 
agents, who are contracted representatives.141  Generally, 
agents receive a fixed percentage of earnings under player 
contracts, which reflects their commission, although some 
receive compensation based on hourly rates instead.142  Player 
agents perform other services as well, such as negotiating 
endorsement contracts, providing financial management and 
accounting advice, and resolving disputes that arise under the 
athlete’s employment contract.143  Significantly, and as in any 
agency relationship, the player (client) possess decision-making 
authority for all aspects pertaining to his profession.144 
The actual framework for contract negotiation between 
player/agent and team greatly depends on the sport and the 
player’s level of experience.  In all four major sports leagues 
(i.e., the NFL, MLB, the NBA, and the NHL), players gain 
entrance by selection in an entry draft, whereby a team 
“drafts” the player, and obtains that player’s rights to play in 
the associated league.145  The primary purpose of a draft is to 
  
 140 See Rob Remis & Diana Sudia, Escaping Athlete Agent Statutory 
Regulation: Loopholes and Constitutional Defectiveness Based on Tri-Parte 
Classification of Athletes, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 1, 65 (1999) (quoting “Definition of 
Athlete” under CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-553 (West 1997)). 
 141 Id. 
 142 Typically, the fixed percentage is between three and five percent of total 
earnings.  Eric Willenbacher, Regulating Sports Agents: Why Current Federal and 
State Efforts Do Not Deter the Unscrupulous Athlete-Agent and How a National 
Licensing System May Cure the Problem, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1225, 1244 & n.139 
(2004) (citing Michael Cohen, Meet the Real Jerry Maguires, BOSTON BUS. J., Oct. 5, 
1998).  More recently, some agents, such as Lon Babby of Williams & Connolly, have 
begun utilizing an hourly rate, rather than commission.  See generally Stacey M. 
Nahrwold, Are Professional Athletes Better Served by a Lawyer-Representative than an 
Agent?  Ask Grant Hill, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 431, 458-60 (1999) (describing 
Babby’s work for Grant Hill of the Orlando Magic).  
 143 James G. Sammataro, Comment, Business and Brotherhood, Can They 
Coincide? A Search into Why Black Athletes Do Not Hire Black Agents, 42 HOW. L.J. 
535, 545 & n.50 (1999) (citing Rob Remis, Analysis of Civil and Criminal Penalties in 
Athlete Agent Statutes and Support for Imposition of Civil and Criminal Liability upon 
Athletes, SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 1, 6 (1998)); see also Richard C. Webb, Personal 
Services Lawyering: Sports, Entertainment, Art or Just Plain Risky Business?, 5 S.C. 
LAW. 11, 12 (1993) (describing myriad duties of player agents, some of which include 
rather undignified duties, such as fielding late-night phone calls pertaining to trivial 
matters).  
 144 See Grace M. Giesel, Enforcement of Settlement Contracts: The Problem of 
the Attorney Agent, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 543, 587-88 (1999) (discussing rights of 
client versus those of agent). 
 145 See Michael A. McCann & Joseph S. Rosen, The Legality of Age 
Restrictions in the NBA and the NFL, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2006), at 
Part 1 (discussing eligibility for NFL and NBA Drafts) (draft of article on file with 
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prevent amateur players from bargaining with multiple 
teams.146  Indeed, in each of the four major leagues, once a team 
drafts an amateur player, his playing rights become the 
exclusive property of that team for at least one calendar year, 
and he can negotiate with no other teams during that time.147  
If a player chooses not to sign and wait one year, the team that 
drafted him no longer controls his rights, but that player’s only 
option to gain entry into the league is to enter the draft again, 
“and if drafted a second time, he again becomes the property of 
[another] team for one year.”148  Practically, therefore, the draft 
is the exclusive entrance for amateur players into professional 
sports. 
Once drafted, an athlete signs a player contract in 
accordance with the league’s collective bargaining agreement.  
There are significant variations among the four major sports 
leagues for entry contracts, as parameters for such contracts 
reflect the product of negotiations between individual leagues 
and players’ associations.  For instance, while players selected 
in the NBA Draft sign for pre-determined salary slots in 
accordance with their draft position,149 players selected in the 
MLB Draft can negotiate their own contracts.  Though heavily 
influenced by draft position, such contracts may vary widely 
upon leveraging circumstances, such as whether the player has 
remaining collegiate eligibility, or whether the team possesses 
sufficient funds to sign its draft selections.150 
  
author); Erik Ekblad, Note, A Slice into the Sand Trap: Why the PGA Was Unwise in 
Its Decision to Push Its Dispute with Casey Martin to the Supreme Court, 32 SW. U. L. 
REV. 151, 174 (2003) (noting mechanics of MLB Draft and NHL Draft).   
 146 See McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 103, at 130. 
 147 See, e.g., NBPA, Collective Bargaining Agreement, July 30, 2005, art. 
X(1)(b)(ii), available at http://nbpa.org/cba_articles/article-X.php#section1 (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2006) (stipulating the rule for players selected in the NBA Draft); NFL 
Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. XVI, 4(b), at 44 (1993), available at 
http://www.nflpa.org/Members/main.asp?subPage=CBA+Complete#art16 (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2006) (stipulating that the playing rights of players selected in the NFL Draft 
remain the property of the drafting team for one calendar year); Jeffrey A. Rosenthal, 
The Amateur Sports Draft: The Best Means to the End?, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 19 n.79 
(1995) [hereinafter Rosenthal] (citing Major League Baseball Professional Rules Book 
4(e) (1988), which stipulates that the playing rights of players selected in the MLB 
Draft remain the property of the drafting team for one calendar year or until the player 
returns to college, whichever is shorter)).  While occasional exceptions to this standard 
exist, they are seldom employed.  Peter N. Katz, Comment, A History of Free Agency in 
the United States and Great Britain: Who’s Leading the Charge, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 
371, 384 n.82 (1994). 
 148 McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 103, at 129-30. 
 149 See discussion infra pp. 1487-88. 
 150 Rosenthal, supra note 147, at 17-20; see also Jack Curry, Fulfilling Great 
Expectations: Barry Lamar Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, § 8, at 1 (describing how 
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Regardless of the league, a drafted player can only 
maximize his earning potential by eventually obtaining “free 
agent” status, whereby the player may negotiate and sign with 
any team.151  Typically, such status emerges only after a player 
has accrued a certain level of service time in a particular 
league, and only after his existing contract has expired.152  
There are two types of free agency: “unrestricted” free agency, 
whereby a player can negotiate and sign with any team after 
his contract expires, and “restricted” free agency, whereby a 
player can likewise negotiate and sign with any team after his 
contract expires, but the original team reserves the right to 
“match” any signed contract or otherwise receive compensation, 
usually in the form of draft selections.153  Thus, an unrestricted 
free agent possesses the optimal bargaining position: he can 
sign with any team, and the team with which he signs owes no 
compensation to his prior team.154 
To illustrate the economic path of a professional athlete, 
consider an amateur player who seeks to enter the NBA.  This 
player must participate in the NBA Draft, in which he will 
either be drafted by a team in one of two rounds, or not 
selected.  If he is drafted in the first round, he will sign a 
guaranteed two-year contract for a pre-determined amount, 
ranging from $9.0 million for the first pick to $1.8 million for 
the last pick in that round.155  The NBA team that drafts him 
  
Barry Bonds was originally drafted in 1982 by the San Francisco Giants, chose to 
attend Arizona State instead, and in 1985 was drafted by the Pittsburgh Pirates, with 
whom he signed). 
 151 See generally WEILER, supra note 132, at 170-97 (discussing free agency’s 
effect on the professional sports leagues).  See also McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 
103, at 212 (discussing impact of free agency on career earnings opportunities for NBA 
players); Note, NFL Free Agency Restrictions Under Antitrust Attack, 1991 DUKE L.J. 
503 (1991) (exploring impact of free agency on player salaries in the NFL). 
 152 For instance, in MLB, a player can only become a free agent after six years 
of service time.  See Joshua Hamilton, Comment, Congress in Relief: The Economic 
Importance of Revoking Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1223, 
1240 & n.144 (1998) (explaining the history and rationale behind the rule). 
 153 See Note, supra note 151, at 503 nn.1-2. 
 154 See Ethan Lock, The Regulatory Scheme for Player Representatives in the 
National Football League: The Real Power of Jerry Maguire, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 319, 326-
28 (1998) (explaining the implications of unrestricted and restricted free agency for 
professional athletes). 
 155 See NBPA, Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 147, at Exhibit B, 
available at http://nbpa.org/cba_exhibits/exhibitB.php (last visited Jan. 26, 2006); see 
also McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 103, at 125 & n.37, 128 & tbl. 4 and 
accompanying text (describing draft pick economics in preceding collective bargaining 
agreement and how players selected in the first round of the NBA Draft can negotiate 
between 80% and 120% of stated annual salaries, and how, in practice, they always 
negotiate 120%).  
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may extend his contract following his second and third seasons, 
although he may become a restricted free agent at the 
conclusion of his fourth season.156  Only at the conclusion of his 
fifth season may he become eligible for unrestricted free 
agency.157  In contrast, if he is drafted in the second round, he 
may obtain unrestricted free agency status earlier in his 
career, although most players selected in the second round sign 
either non-guaranteed contracts for the league minimum 
($398,762) or simply fail to earn a contract.158  If he is not 
drafted in either round, then he immediately becomes an 
unrestricted free agent, though seldom does such a player ever 
play in the NBA.159 
Assuming the player described in the preceding 
paragraph becomes a star, his earning capacity as an 
unrestricted free agent would prove quite impressive.  Indeed, 
after completion of his rookie contract, and upon becoming an 
unrestricted free agent, that player may sign a contract worth 
up to the “maximum contract,” which reflects the longest and 
  
 156 NBPA, Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 147, at art. VIII, 
available at http://nbpa.org/cba_articles/article-VIII.php (last visited Mar. 2, 2006).  
 157 From a practical standpoint, most players remain with their team at the 
conclusion of the fourth season.  Indeed, the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement 
preserves the so-called “Larry Bird exception,” which allows teams to exceed the salary 
cap in order to re-sign their own players (also called “Larry Bird rights”).  See McCann, 
Illegal Defense, supra note 103, at 124-25.  Thus, when a first round pick concludes his 
fourth season, usually the team for which he has played can offer him the most. 
 158 See NBPA, Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 147, at Exhibit C, 
available at http://nbpa.org/cba_exhibits/exhibitC.php (last visited Jan. 26, 2006).  Very 
rarely, a second round pick will surprise the NBA and become a competent player or 
even a star player.  Under the 1999 Collective Bargaining Agreement, such star 
players could gain optimal negotiating power at the conclusion of their second season—
when their rookie contracts would typically expire—as they became “non-Larry Bird-
rights restricted free agents,” since Larry Bird rights only manifest after a player plays 
three seasons.  As a result, the “restricted” nature of their free agency was curtailed, 
since, due to the absence of Larry Bird rights, the team for which they played could not 
re-sign them for any amount above the salary cap.  This very machination arose in 
2003, when 2001 second round pick Gilbert Arenas of the Golden State Warriors 
became a restricted free agent, and because Arenas had no Larry Bird rights and 
because the Warriors’ payroll exceeded the league-imposed salary cap, the Warriors 
could not match the six-year, $65 million free agent contract Arenas had signed with 
the Washington Wizards.  See McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 103, at 126-27.  The 
2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement, however, disallows other teams from offering 
such a player more than $4.5 million for his third season, an amount all NBA teams 
may utilize through its “mid-level exception” to the salary cap, regardless of whether 
the team’s payroll exceeds the salary cap.  As a result, teams may hold on to their 
second-round picks long enough to invoke their Larry Bird rights.  See NBPA, 
Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 147, at art. XI(5), available at 
http://nbpa.org/cba_articles/article-XI.php#section5 (last visited Mar. 2, 2006); see also 
NBPA, Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 147, at art. X(1)(b)(ii), available at 
http://nbpa.org/cba_articles/article-X.php#section1 (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 
 159 See McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 103, at 122.  
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most lucrative contract allowable under the NBA’s collective 
bargaining agreement.160  Currently, that maximum contract is 
worth approximately $91 million over a six-year period.161  
Although such a contract is typically reserved for the league’s 
best players, even far less-heralded players may obtain 
exorbitant deals as unrestricted free agents.162  This 
phenomenon is not unique to basketball, as unrestricted free 
agents in baseball, football, and hockey likewise position 
themselves for extraordinarily lucrative contracts.163 
Thus, the most dynamic setting for professional sports 
contracting occurs when a player becomes an unrestricted free 
agent, attracts meaningful interest from multiple teams, and 
negotiates with those teams to yield the optimal contract.  Put 
differently, this setting offers a “competitive market,” since 
there exists a market of sellers (i.e., the teams) competing for 
the attraction of a buyer (i.e., the player).164  Though varying 
circumstances, such as number of interested teams and relative 
skill of representation, as well as collectively-bargained 
restraints of trade, such as “salary caps” and “luxury taxes,”165 
  
 160 See NBPA, Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 147, at art. II(7), 
available at http://nbpa.org/cba_articles/article-II.php#section7 (last visited Jan. 26, 
2006). 
 161 Id.  This figure is based on an amount up to thirty percent of the NBA’s 
salary cap in effect at the time the contract is executed, and can thus change in 
correspondence to any changes in the salary cap.  Id. at art. II(7)(a)(2). 
 162 For instance, consider Mark Blount, the much-maligned Minnesota 
Timberwolves center, who, as an unrestricted free agent in 2004, managed to secure a 
six-year contract worth $42 million with the Boston Celtics.  Shira Springer, Celtics Do 
New Deal for Blount, BOSTON GLOBE, July 9, 2004, at E1.  Another strikingly lucrative 
free agent contract was obtained by Derek Fisher, the venerable but middling point 
guard, who, as an unrestricted free agent in 2004, signed a six-year contract worth $37 
million.  David DuPree, Lakers Have Plenty of Retooling To Do, USA TODAY, July 16, 
2004, at 14C. 
 163 See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 132, at 185 (“[A]verage MLB salaries have 
soared under free agency.”); see also Mélanie Aubut, When Negotiations Fail: An 
Analysis of Salary Arbitration and Salary Cap Systems, 10 SPORTS LAW. J. 189, 198-
201 (describing optimal bargaining position for MLB players); Lock, supra note 154, at 
335-39 (describing optimal bargaining position for NFL players); Stephen F. Ross, The 
NHL Labour Dispute and the Common Law, The Competition Act, and Public Policy, 37 
U.B.C. L. REV. 343, 403 (2004) (describing optimal bargaining position for NHL 
players).  
 164 See Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and 
Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1790 (1997).  
 165 A salary cap is a ceiling on the total amount teams may spend on player 
salaries, while a luxury tax requires teams with payrolls over a particular threshold to 
pay a percentage of the excess to the other teams in the league.  Id.  Thus, a salary cap 
imposes an actual limit on team payroll, while a luxury tax serves as a deterrent to 
teams that would otherwise spend above a certain threshold.  See generally Thomas A. 
Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional Sports, 79 B.U. L. 
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affect the degree of market competition, meaningful 
engagement among multiple parties tends to emerge whenever 
a player becomes an unrestricted free agent.166 
Lastly, note the relatively brief earnings curve for most 
professional athletes, and thus their limited window of time to 
capitalize on lucrative earnings.  Indeed, in all four major 
leagues, the average career only lasts between four and six 
years,167 and only a small percent of players within those 
leagues play into their late thirties or beyond.168  Along those 
lines, most professional athletes are considered in their “prime” 
for a mere two- or three-year stretch, which typically occurs 
between the ages of 27 and 30; outside of that window, athletes 
usually possess diminished earnings potential.169  Thus, and 
along with the need to accrue sufficient service time in order to 
obtain free agent eligibility, many professional athletes possess 
only one opportunity to “cash in” as unrestricted free agents.  
In part for that reason, many seek to maximize their earnings 
as free agents.  This topic, along with evidence of alternative 
free agent pursuits, will be explored in the following section. 
V. IDENTIFYING CHOICE, BIAS, AND HEURISTICS AMONG 
PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES 
A. Evidence of Monetary-Maximizing Values Among 
Professional Athletes 
The setting of an unrestricted free agent negotiating 
with multiple teams drives several analytical interpretations.  
Traditional rational choice theory would posit that such an 
athlete, like any rational actor, would pursue maximization of 
  
REV. 889, 936-39 (1999) (comparing salary caps and luxury taxes as modes to ensure 
competitive play in professional sports). 
 166 Other externalities might include an absence of perfect information and 
certain obstacles to the execution of contracts, such as league approval. 
 167 See McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 103, at 170 (noting that the 
average NBA career lasts five years); Alan Gersten, Show Me the Money: Why 
Professional Athletes Make Tough Clients, FIN. PLANNING, Mar. 1, 2005, at 5 (noting 
that the average NHL career lasts six years, the average MLB career lasts three and a 
half years, and the average NFL career also lasts three and a half years).  
 168 See, e.g., McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 103, at 170 (discussing how 
only three percent of NBA players are over the age of thirty-five); Martin Miller, 
Raising the Bar at 40, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2003, at F1 (noting how, in 2003, only 
eleven MLB players, nine NHL players, six NFL players, and two NBA players were 
forty or older).  
 169 Id.  But see Michael Russo, Many Free Agents, Not Much Money, SUN-
SENTINEL, July 1, 2001, at 15C (noting several large contracts obtained by aging NHL 
players).  
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“utility,” as best, or most readily evidenced by monetary 
wealth.  This deduction may be observed at both the macro and 
micro level.  Most dramatically, consider the recent precipitous 
rise in player salaries, an ascent primarily attributed to the 
maximization of monetary interests during free agent 
bargaining.170  For instance, since 1995, the average NHL 
player salary has risen by 245 percent ($733,000 to $1.8 
million), during which time league revenue has grown by only 
163 percent.171  Similarly astounding, consider that since 1983, 
the average NBA player salary has grown by 1,892 percent 
($246,000 to $4.9 million),172 or that since 1989, the average 
MLB player salary has risen by 423 percent ($497,000 to $2.6 
million).173  These trends suggest that maximization of wealth 
proves a salient consideration to many professional athletes, 
thus corroborating a traditional rational choice model.  
On a micro level, traditional rational choice would find 
that when players (and their representatives) negotiate with 
teams, they each begin with a reservation price, defined in this 
context as the maximum amount each is willing to relinquish 
or the minimum amount each is willing to accept.174  To 
illustrate, imagine a player who seeks a contract extension 
  
 170 See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN 
UNFAIR GAME (2003) (discussing precipitous increase in salaries among MLB players 
since the advent of free agency, and how such a development has disadvantaged 
smaller-market teams); Richard A. Kaplan, Note, The NBA Luxury Tax Model: A 
Misguided Regulatory Scheme, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1615 (2004) (studying economic 
trends in the NBA); Sanjay José’ Mullick, Browns to Baltimore: Franchise Free Agency 
and the New Economics of the NFL, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1 (1996) (studying economic 
trends in the NFL); Joseph M. Weiler, Legal Analysis of the NHL Players’ Contract, 3 
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 59 (1992) (studying economic trends in the NHL); ANDREW 
ZIMBALIST, MAY THE BEST TEAM WIN: BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (2003) 
(studying economic trends in MLB). 
 171 See Dave Stubbs, Europe Might Elbow NHL out of Picture, MONTREAL 
GAZETTE, Feb. 17, 2005, at A3 (noting the increase in player salary); Michael Arace, 
Players Ratify New Deal, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 22, 2005, at 1F (noting the 
increase in league revenue). 
 172 See Looking for a Model? Try the NBA, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 16, 2004, at C4 
(noting the current average NBA salary); David Dupree, NBA: Red Ink and a Bleak 
Future, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1983, at D1 (noting the average NBA salary in 1983).  
The increase in average NBA salary has closely approximated the increase in league 
revenue, which has risen 1,840 percent since 1983 ($160 million to $3.1 billion).  
Looking for a Model?, supra (citing current league revenue); Union Alters Stance, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 26, 1983, at 1 (noting projected revenues for 1984-85 season). 
 173 See Murray Chass, Players’ Figures Show $497,254 Pay Average, SPORTING 
NEWS, Dec. 18, 1989, at 44 (noting the average MLB salary in 1989) (on file with 
author); Tim Tucker, Baseball Pay Creeps Up, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 10, 2005, at 2E 
(noting the current average MLB  salary). 
 174 See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: 
BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 51 (1986). 
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from his existing team, but because he has not yet accrued 
sufficient service time for free agent eligibility, he cannot 
pursue employment with any other team should such an 
extension fail.175  If this player enters contract negotiations 
with a reservation price of $2 million per year, it means that he 
is unwilling to accept any contract that pays him less than $2 
million per year, and also that he is willing to pursue non-
contractual resolutions in lieu of a contract for less than $2 
million per year.  The primary such resolution is a “hold-out,” 
whereby the player refuses to report to his team (and thus 
forfeits pay) in hopes that doing so will motivate that team to 
acquiesce.176  
Importantly, there exists a meaningful distinction 
between “public” and “private” reservation prices, and such 
prices may evolve in accordance with unexpected or non-static 
market conditions.177  For instance, after completing his most 
recent contract with the Atlanta Braves in October 2003, 
pitcher Greg Maddux instructed his agent to inform teams that 
he would accept no less than a two-year contract worth $20 
million.178  After four months of unexpectedly lukewarm 
interest, however, Maddux would agree to a two-year contract 
worth $15 million with the Chicago Cubs.179 
  
 175 This fact-pattern arises with some regularity in MLB, the NFL, and the 
NHL, though less often in the NBA, as the league’s CBA stipulates more discernable 
contract parameters, thus diminishing opportunities for discord between player and 
team in negotiating contract extensions.  See McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 103, 
at 195. 
 176 For instance, during NFL training camp in August 2004, Miami Dolphins’ 
defensive end Adewale Ogunleye held out in hopes of receiving a long-term extension 
instead of a one-year extension tendered by the Dolphins.  Alex Marvez & Keven 
Lerner, Dolphins Reward Chambers, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 6, 2004, at D3.  Rather 
than acquiescing to his demand, the Dolphins traded Ogunleye to the Chicago Bears, 
who promptly signed Ogunleye to a long-term extension.  Mike Mulligan, Bears Can 
Alter Stingy Image in a Buy Week, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 24, 2004, at 105; see also Basil 
M. Loeb, Comment, Deterring Player Holdouts: Who Should Do It, How to Do it, and 
Why It Has to Be Done, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 275, 275-79 (2001) (providing a 
detailed background of holdouts in professional sports and how players internalize the 
relative risks and benefits of pursuing holdouts). 
 177 See Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market 
Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1237 n.150 (describing how 
reservation prices are affected by modified expectations and how they may be 
strategically revised to accommodate such expectations). 
 178 See Tom Verducci, Hard Line: Will Scott Boras’s Waiting Game Help or 
Hurt His Clients This Year?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 19, 2004, at 84. 
 179 Mike Kiley, Wood Takes Cubs’ Sales Pitch, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 28, 2004, 
at 102 (noting also that the contract included a possible third year for $9 million if 
Maddux pitches a certain number of innings during the 2004 and 2005 seasons).  
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During actual negotiations, rational choice analysis 
would find players and teams attempting to identify their 
bargaining zone, which, as discussed in Section II, comprises 
the range of amounts between competing reservation prices.180  
Within this range, any amount would prove “mutually 
beneficial, or ‘Pareto superior’ to the alternative of not reaching 
an agreement.”181  Put more succinctly by Richard Posner, 
Pareto superior “makes at least one person better off and no 
one worse off.”182   
In the context of professional sports negotiations, 
effectively identifying the bargaining zone depends upon 
negotiation parameters, such as whether the negotiations 
concern a free agent or a current employee, as well as the 
number of potential suitors for the player.  Predictably, a free 
agent with numerous teams pursuing his services generally 
has less of an incentive to identify a bargaining zone with any 
one of those teams than would a player negotiating a contract 
extension with his present team, particularly if that player 
would not become a free agent in the near future.183  Bargaining 
zones may also provide room for settlement when the parties 
reach incompatible estimates of each others’ reservation 
price.184  Along those lines, settlement proves especially likely 
  
 180 See discussion infra pp. 1464-65 and accompanying notes; see also Russell 
Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1816-17 (2000).  
Professor Robert H. Mnookin characterizes the bargaining zone as the “zone of possible 
agreement.”  See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO 
CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 20 (2000). 
 181 See Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, supra note 23, at 5. 
 182 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14 (5th ed. 1998). 
 183 Even with the more favorable circumstances described herein, a player 
may nevertheless prove unwilling to constructively pursue the bargaining zone.  For 
instance, as discussed below on pages 1520-1524, at the start of the 2003 MLB season, 
it is speculated that Boston Red Sox shortstop Nomar Garciaparra was unwilling to 
negotiate a contract extension, despite the team’s interest in consummating one, and 
despite the fact that Garciaparra would not be eligible for free agency until after the 
2004 season.  Dan Shaughnessy, Damaged Goods: Deal Garciaparra, BOSTON GLOBE, 
July 3, 2004, at G1 [hereinafter Shaughnessy, Damaged Goods] (asserting that Red 
Sox management doubted Garciaparra’s actual willingness to negotiate).  But see Julie 
S. Turner, The Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a Theory of Efficient 
Infringement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 179, 197 (1998) (describing the presence of multiple 
parties as an impediment to the consummation of an agreement between two parties). 
 184 George A. Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, When Ignorance Is Bliss: 
Information Exchange and Inefficiency in Bargaining, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 45 (2004) 
(describing the value of large bargaining zones in difficult negotiations). 
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when parties perceive limited or unsatisfying alternatives to an 
agreement.185 
Nevertheless, incompatible estimates of competing 
reservation prices occasionally yield impasse, whereby the 
parties, frustrated by their failure to reach a number within 
the bargaining zone, cease negotiations.186  Some traditional 
rational choice theorists believe that impasse arises due to a 
lack of shared information, which eventually motivates parties 
to misinterpret each others’ reservation price.187  More recent 
analysis, however, suggests that sharing of information may 
actually promote divergence between the parties, particularly 
when such information invites disparate interpretation.188  This 
later finding appears corroborated by the “self-serving” bias 
apparent during negotiations, as even contemporary rational 
choice analysis identifies a tendency among parties to interpret 
information in egoistic ways, thus further impairing their 
pursuit of a mutually-satisfying number.189   
To illustrate the difficulties of identifying a number 
within the bargaining zone, as well as the presence of self-
serving bias in estimating the competing reservation price, 
consider the effect of “market-setting” contracts in professional 
sports.  These contracts establish an economic barometer by 
which other players and teams may determine market value in 
the same economic period.  This barometer is especially 
illuminating in a free agency period, as it allows instant and 
contemporaneous comparisons of existing free agents with 
those who had recently signed contracts.  Often, comparative 
  
 185 See Kevin C. McMunigal, The Costs of Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity of 
Adjudication on Litigating Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. REV. 833, 861 n.106 (1990) (noting 
that negotiations are guided by the presence of alternative and viable opportunities). 
 186 Impasse may be defined as “that point at which the parties have exhausted 
the prospects of concluding an agreement and further discussions would be fruitless.”  
Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund for N. California v. Advanced Lightweight 
Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 543 n.5 (1988). 
 187 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 525 (3d ed. 1986); see 
also Steven Shavell, Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation, 20 RAND 
J. ECON. 183 (1989) (applying information-sharing to the context of litigation, and 
finding that discovery promotes settlement since it reveals information to opposing 
parties). 
 188 See Loewenstein & Moore, supra note 184, at 38-39.  
 189 See George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and 
Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 159 (1993) (identifying implications of self-
serving assessments of fairness for bargaining). 
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characteristics include relative performance to date, 
expectation of future performance, age, and injury history.190 
For example, consider that when the New York Mets 
signed pitcher Kris Benson to a three-year, $22.5 million 
contract at the start of the 2004 free agency period, observers 
perceived the contract as “market-setting,” since it established 
a contemporary value for free agent pitchers of Benson’s ilk.191  
Indeed, following consummation of Benson’s contract, a 
number of free agent pitchers elevated their asking prices, and 
estimated their market value as greater than that of Benson, 
and thus warranting a contract in excess of a three-year, $22.5 
million term.192  In response, the relevant negotiating teams 
tended to dismiss the Benson contract as reflective of one 
team’s desperation to win—and thus its willingness to pay 
above market value.193  Therefore, the “new information” of 
Benson’s contract proved sufficiently ambiguous as to invite 
contrasting interpretations by the negotiating parties.  In fact, 
several free agent pitchers and teams so disparately 
internalized the Benson contract that their negotiations 
reached irreparable impasses.194  Subsequently, those pitchers 
initiated negotiations with new teams, and reached contracts 
consistent with the market established by the Benson 
contract.195  Accordingly, by potentially bifurcating existing 
negotiations, a market-setting contract might establish a 
barometer of varying compatibility to existing and potential 
  
 190 See, e.g., Rick Carpiniello, Free Agent Situations Are Getting Sticky, J. 
NEWS, Oct. 17, 1999, at 7C (describing contract negotiations with star players in the 
NHL); see also Jeffrey D. Schneider, Note, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: The Lack of Free 
Agency in the NFL, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 797 (1991) (discussing relevant characteristics 
for free agent analysis). 
 191 See Larry Stone, Winners of Winter, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 25, 2005, at D1 
(“[T]he pitching market was established, most GMs agree, when the Mets signed Kris 
Benson to a three-year, $22.5 million contract.”). 
 192 See, e.g., Tyler Kepner, Age-Wary Yanks Pick Wright over Lieber, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at D7 (noting that the Benson contract prompted free agent 
pitcher Jon Lieber to increase his own contract demands). 
 193 See Mark Hale, Sosa in Sight: But Fat Pact Could Break Deal for Mets, 
N.Y. POST, Nov. 13, 2004, at 72 (describing the desire of new Mets’ general manager 
Omar Minaya to “make a splash”). 
 194 See, e.g., Bob Elliott, D-Backs on Spending Spree: A Day After Landing 
Troy Glaus, Arizona Signs Russ Ortiz to a Four-Year, $33 Million Deal, TORONTO STAR, 
Dec. 11, 2004, at S8 (citing remarks by Blue Jays’ general manager J.P. Ricciardi that 
Russ Ortiz altered his contract demands with the Atlanta Braves after the Benson 
contract); Todd Zolecki, Yankees’ Missed Opportunity a Plus for Phillies, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Mar. 6, 2005, at D6 (discussing how the New York Yankees refused the 
revised demands of free agent pitcher Jon Lieber following the Benson contract, 
leading Lieber to sign with the Philadelphia Phillies). 
 195 See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
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teams, and thus impair the capacity of contemporaneously 
negotiating parties to identify a number within the bargaining 
zone.196 
B. Evidence of Alternative Preferences Among Professional 
Athletes 
The preceding discussion frames player-team contract 
negotiations as entirely driven by the distribution of monetary 
resources.  That is, it assumes that players exclusively value 
financial compensation when seeking employment 
opportunities.  Such an assumption is commonly held among 
Americans.197  Media and other journalists often feel 
similarly.198   
Such framing begs an important question: Why should 
society assume that professional athletes are unusually 
interested in monetary wealth?  Indeed, as discussed in Section 
II, when individuals pursue employment opportunities, they 
often identify considerable value in non-monetary forms of 
“utility.”199  Such forms of utility might include objective 
characteristics, such as preferred location or job title, or 
intangibles, such as projected happiness or anticipated social 
status.200  These ideas are also consistent with rational 
decision-making, since “rationality” of choice refers to the 
  
 196 See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text. 
 197 See Thomas Boswell, Players, Owners and Us, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1994, 
at F1.  Similarly, most Americans believe that athletes are paid too much money.  Don 
Walker, Baseball Slips a Bit on State Poll: Interest Drops with Attendance, MILWAUKEE 
J. SENTINEL, May 26, 2003, at 6C (citing survey conducted by the University of 
Wisconsin that found that 89 percent of Americans believe professional athletes make 
too much money); see also, Michael Hiestand, Put a Lid on Pro Player Salaries, USA 
TODAY, Sept. 2, 2004, at 3C (citing remarks by Ralph Cindrich, an NFL player agent 
and former NFL player, who stated the opinion that if Americans were polled, 98 
percent would say that “athletes are paid too much” money).  Data suggests that 
teenagers feel likewise.  See, e.g., Teen Ink, February 2001 Poll: Do Baseball Players 
Make Too Much Money, available at http://www.teenink.com/Poll/PastPolls.html (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2006) (finding that 71 percent of teenagers believe baseball players 
“make too much money”); Most Kids Look Up To Athletes: Fewer Are Influenced by 
Them, 12 YOUTH MARKETS ALERT 1 (2000) (finding that 43 percent of children ages ten 
to seventeen believe that athletes appear in ads for charities to get paid and improve 
their personal image, rather than caring about the cause). 
 198 See, e.g., Mark Patinkin, For Too Many Pro Athletes, It’s All About the 
Money, PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 20, 2005, at A2 (regarding the NHL Lockout of 2004-05 as 
evidence of greed among NHL players); Bob Raissman, Going Ratings Bad News for 
Boss, DAILY NEWS (New York), June 11, 2000, at 67 (“This is [a sports] era where it’s 
all about the money.”). 
 199 See discussion supra pp. 1462-63. 
 200 See id. 
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methodological pursuit of personal preferences, which vary by 
individual.  Thus, unless professional athletes prove somehow 
“more greedy” than the average person, they should exhibit, 
with similar frequency, a preference for non-monetary forms of 
utility when contemplating employment opportunities. 
A review of expressed player motivations for accepting 
offers reveals a wide-range of preferences.  Although many 
athletes pursue the most lucrative offer available, many others 
opt for less remunerative opportunities.  Through the following 
illustrations, this Article will explore alternative optimal 
preferences to monetary aggrandizement, and how professional 
athletes often embrace those preferences.  In doing so, this 
Article will attempt to explain behavioral tendencies among 
professional athletes and how those athletes navigate 
preferences when contemplating contractual opportunities.  To 
begin this analysis, this Article will examine a question framed 
strikingly dissonant with popular expectations: Why do many 
professional athletes choose to stay in a setting when playing 
elsewhere would pay substantially more? 
1. Environmental Preference: Remaining in Place 
According to many economists, individuals find it 
efficient to preserve familiar settings, such as location or 
personal contacts, and they attribute appreciable value to that 
preservation.201  Similarly, psychologists often maintain that 
individuals derive confidence from acquainted surroundings, 
and that such confidence influences their decision-making.202  
This phenomenon is sometimes described as “regional affinity” 
or “hometown bias,” whereby individuals internalize intrinsic 
  
 201 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) (assessing value of familiarity in decision-
making among individuals in hiring capacities); see also J.D. Trout & Shahid A. 
Buttar, Resurrecting “Death Taxes”: Inheritance, Redistribution, and the Science of 
Happiness, 16 J.L. & POL. 765, 802 n.118 (2000) (describing the psychological cost of 
those who fled the United States to Canada to avoid service in the Vietnam War). 
 202 See ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 89 (1996) (noting that 
college students perform worse on tests taken in unfamiliar surroundings); see also 
Peter J. Cohen, How Shall They Be Known? Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 
and Eyewitness Identification, 16 PACE L. REV. 237, 248 (1996) (describing how 
individuals function better in familiar surroundings); D. Michael Risinger & Jeffrey L. 
Loop, Three Card Monte, Monty Hall, Modus Operandi and “Offender Profiling”: Some 
Lessons of Modern Cognitive Science for the Law of Evidence, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 193, 
275 n.434 (2002) (quoting JOHN E. DOUGLAS ET AL., CRIME CLASSIFICATION MANUAL § 
132 (1992)) (describing how criminal behavior is in part motivated by confidence 
through familiar surroundings). 
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value in remaining in a set location, and perceive themselves 
as better off by doing so.203 
Professional athletes sometimes evince striking value in 
the preservation of their surroundings.  To illustrate, consider 
Edmonton Oilers goaltender Tommy Salo, who, in 2000, agreed 
to a three-year contract extension worth $10.4 million.204  
Although impressive, his contract likely reflected a market 
discount of approximately $4 million, as he declined the 
opportunity to pursue unrestricted agency at the earliest date 
in his career.205  Salo, however, articulated a preference for 
staying in Edmonton, as it reminded him of his native land, 
Sweden, and its citizens reminded him of Swedes.206  His 
preferences illuminate how a professional athlete may 
internalize “wealth” as a concept inclusive of non-economic 
terms, including preservation of surroundings. 
Similarly, during his nineteen-year career with the 
Cincinnati Reds, shortstop Barry Larkin, a Cincinnati native, 
identified meaningful subjective value in maintaining existing 
conditions.  Indeed, during that time, Larkin declined several 
more lucrative opportunities to play elsewhere, reasoning that 
his continued stay in Cincinnati would exceed in value.207  
Intriguingly, the subjective benefit of preserving familiarity 
came with a subjective cost: throughout his career, Larkin 
endured disapprobation from fellow players and their agents 
for accepting less compensation to stay in Cincinnati, as doing 
so may have diminished the market value for players of his 
ilk.208  Thus, the opportunity cost of forgoing enhanced 
compensation may include not only the difference in tangible 
  
 203 See Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for 
“Adequacy” in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 
775 n.50 (1998). 
 204 See Mario Annicchiarico, Stop Sign: Salo Takes Long-Term Lease on Oilers’ 
Cord Cottage, EDMONTON SUN, Nov. 3, 2000, at SP1. 
 205 Id. (citing comments by Salo’s agent). 
 206 Id. (quoting Salo, “[My fiancée and I] both like it here, it’s almost like back 
home . . . . Friendly people, a good club and I’m happy to be here.  That’s why I signed 
the contract.”). 
 207 See, e.g., Hal McCoy, Reds Sign MVP Larkin Through 2000, DAYTON DAILY 
NEWS, Jan. 3, 1996, at 1D (quoting Larkin: “I love Cincinnati—my wife (Lisa) and I are 
both are [sic] from here.  I’m happy here and I’ve been treated well.  The Reds have 
been good to me.  And I didn’t want to have to test the free agent market after next 
season.”). 
 208 See Hal McCoy, Larkin Feels Asking Price Is Fair, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, 
July 20, 2000, at 1D (quoting Larkin: “[B]ecause I signed for less money when I signed 
my contracts in the past . . . I caught a lot of grief from guys around the league and 
other agents for signing for under value.”). 
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compensation, but also the “cost” of coping with hard feelings 
from peers who are more interested in financial recompense. 
Other professional athletes indicate a preference to stay 
in a location because of positive relations with teammates and 
coaches, coupled with uncertainty as to whether such relations 
may manifest in other settings.  To illustrate, when Teemu 
Selanne re-signed with the San Jose Sharks in 2002, he 
accepted a pay reduction of nearly $3 million from his prior 
annual salary of $9 million, even though, as an unrestricted 
free agent, a number of teams were offering to pay him more 
than $9 million per year.209  At the time, the cash-strapped 
Sharks lacked the budgetary resources to pay Selanne his 
market value, thus forcing him to compare the subjective value 
of remaining a member of the Sharks with the subjective value 
of playing elsewhere for more money.210  In explaining his 
decision to re-sign, Selanne described how, over the course of 
his eleven-year career, he had become increasingly appreciative 
of team camaraderie, as well as the feeling of playing for a 
“classy organization,” and that such “personal goals” proved 
greater in value than additional millions of dollars.211  
Reflecting upon Selanne’s decision to forgo several million 
dollars, Sharks’ general manager Dean Lombardi noted, “this 
is clearly a case where money was not important.”212 
In exploring the role of alternative preferences among 
professional athletes, loyalty may offer a useful corollary to 
positive relations with teammates and coaches.  As a 
behavioral concept, “loyalty” refers to a continuous cognitive 
affirmation of a particular entity, such as a nation, employer, 
or team, and its continuousness results from the feelings of 
well-being that it generates.213  Continuous cognitive 
affirmation, however, tends to trigger suppression or 
obfuscation of negative associations, while promoting the 
exaggeration or even invention of favorable aspects.214  More 
  
 209 See Robin Brownlee, Selanne’s a Fine Fit in San Jose: Teemu Enjoying Life 
in Fast Lane with Sharks, EDMONTON SUN, Oct. 18, 2002, at SP2. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. (quoting Selanne, “I could have got more money other places, but you 
have to see the whole picture.”).  
 212 See Selanne Spurns East to Stay with Sharks, OTTAWA SUN, July 6, 2002, 
at 56. 
 213 See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974).  
 214 Id.; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Opening Closed Chambers, 108 YALE L.J. 
1087, 1103-04 (questioning the desirability of loyalty when Supreme Court clerks 
refrain from discussing their experiences on the Court); Randall Morck, Behavioral 
Finance in Corporate Governance-Independent Directors and Non-Executive Chairs, 
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simply put, loyal persons tend to ignore the bad and focus on 
the good of their object of loyalty, and they do so because it 
makes them happy. 
Considering the subjective value of happiness 
engendered by loyalty, perhaps it should come as no surprise 
that certain professional athletes identify a duty of loyalty to 
their team as a rationale for accepting less compensation.  To 
illustrate, consider the decision-making process of St. Louis 
Cardinals pitcher Matt Morris, who, in signing a three-year, 
$27 million contract in January 2002, accepted a steep 
hometown discount.215  At the time, the 26-year old Morris had 
recently completed a dominant, 22-win season and was eligible 
to become a free agent at the conclusion of the 2002 season, 
when he may have obtained twice the salary on the open 
market.216  Though acknowledging that he “definitely left 
money on the table,” Morris highlighted a sense of loyalty to 
the team, particularly since it had “always treated [him] well” 
and helped him recuperate from injuries.217  For Morris, this 
sense of loyalty may have been worth $27 million, thus 
illuminating the material degree of subjective value associable 
with alternative preferences. 
Professional athletes also occasionally cite family 
considerations as a rationale for remaining in a location, as 
some are willing to sacrifice meaningful compensation in order 
to stay in close proximity to family members.  For instance, 
during the 2002 MLB season, Tampa Bay Devil Rays’ first 
baseman Fred McGriff initially refused to waive a no-trade 
clause in his contract after the team had agreed to trade him to 
the Chicago Cubs.218  At the time, the Devil Rays were in last 
place, while the Cubs were positioning themselves for a World 
Series run.  Along with the opportunity to join a contending 
  
Harvard Institute Economic Research Discussion Paper 2037, at 3 (2004), available at 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2004papers/HIER2037.pdf (discussing risks of 
loyalty among corporate officers).  
 215 See Rick Hummel, Morris Says Cards Were Fair in Negotiations on 
Contract, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 5, 2002, at 18.  
 216 Id.  In fact, Morris finished third in the balloting for the 2001 Cy Young 
Award.  See Baseball-Reference.com, Awards Voting for 2001, http://www.baseball-
reference.com/awards/awards_2001.shtml (last visited Jan. 4, 2006); see also Bernie 
Miklasz, Rams Wouldn’t Mind Meeting “Someone New” in Playoffs, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 5, 2002, at 3 (describing how Morris “could have made a lot more 
money if he’d waited a season to test the free-agent market”). 
 217 See Hummel, supra note 215. 
 218 See Stephen Cannella, Inside Baseball, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 6, 2001, 
at 70. 
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team, the Cubs also offered to raise McGriff’s annual salary 
from $6.75 million to $7.25 million, as well as extend his 
contract for an additional year at a salary of $8.5 million—an 
extraordinary economic conferral for a 39-year old first 
baseman.219  McGriff, however, posited the value of remaining 
with his wife and two young children as greater in value than 
playing for a contender and an enhancement in pay: “I get to 
see my family all the time [in Tampa]; I’m happy.”220  
Nevertheless, such subjective value apparently contained a 
discernable limit: McGriff agreed to the trade 19 days later, 
after the Cubs had offered even more money, and apparently to 
a sufficient level for McGriff to value waiving his no-trade 
clause over remaining with his family in Tampa.221 
2. Environmental Preference: Moving to a Preferable 
Setting 
Professional athletes also choose to play in new locales 
that satisfy certain wants over other opportunities that might 
pay more.  In some instances, professional athletes yearn to 
return home, or to be close to family; in others, they seek to 
experience characteristics of the setting, such as favorable 
weather, cultural offerings, or societal tendencies.  Social 
psychologists sometimes describe the desire to move to a 
particular location as part of one’s “active agen[cy],” whereby 
individuals interpret their preferences to be associative of a 
new locale.222  As evinced by the decision-making methodology 
of certain free agents, active agency appears highly salient in 
professional sports. 
To illustrate, consider the much-queried decision of 
Utah Jazz power forward and unrestricted free agent Donyell 
  
 219 Id.  Generally, position players in their late thirties and early forties have 
difficulty securing such exorbitant contracts.  See, e.g., Susan Vinella & John Mangells, 
Nothing Personal: The Indians’ Analysis Shows It Makes Little Business Sense to Offer 
Long Contracts to Older Players, PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 22, 2003, at A1.  But see Gordon 
Edes, Dodgers Break Bank to Land Ace Brown, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 13, 1998, at E1 
(citing concern by Sandy Alderson, executive vice president of baseball operations for 
Major League Baseball, that players in their late thirties and early forties will 
eventually obtain lucrative contracts with more regularity). 
 220 See Bruce Miles, Cubs Not Giving Up Hope on McGriff, CHI. DAILY 
HERALD, July 13, 2001, at 1 (emphasis added). 
 221 See Cannella, supra note 218, at 70.  McGriff claimed that he ultimately 
agreed to the trade because he “didn’t want to make a hasty decision.  I knew I had 
time to think about it. I wanted to analyze things.”  Id. 
 222 See Dorothy Rowe, Watching You Watching Me, 10 OPEN MIND 45, 50 
(2003). 
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Marshall during the 2002 off season: he elected to sign a three-
year, $14 million contract with the Chicago Bulls, even though 
he was offered a four-year, $27 million contract to stay with the 
Jazz.223  In explaining his decision, Marshall stated a preference 
for living in Chicago and experiencing its culture over living in 
Salt Lake City and continuing to experience its culture, and 
that such a preference was worth more to him than the 
significant disparity in pay.224  Paradoxically, that same off-
season, Philadelphia 76ers power forward and fellow 
unrestricted free agent Matt Harpring signed a four-year 
contract with the Jazz worth $18.5 million, or $2.5 million less 
than he was offered by the Bulls for the same length of 
contract.225  In other words, while Marshall was willing to 
accept less money in order to leave Utah for Chicago, Harpring 
was willing to take less to move there instead of Chicago. 
Similarly influential may be preference for warm 
weather, particularly after playing in cold weather 
environments for some years.  The decision-making process of 
nose tackle Fred Smerlas in 1990 demonstrated this concept.  
At the time, Smerlas, who had played the previous eleven 
seasons with the Buffalo Bills, was an unrestricted free agent 
in receipt of three offers: a guaranteed, two-year, $1 million 
offer from the New England Patriots; a non-guaranteed, one-
year, $650,000 offer from the Bills; and a non-guaranteed, one-
year, $500,000 offer from the San Francisco 49ers.226  Smerlas 
selected the 49ers’ offer, even though it was the least lucrative, 
  
 223 See Rich Evans, Marshall Gets Less $$$ to Sign with Chicago, DESERET 
NEWS, Aug. 17, 2002, at D5. 
 224 See Lacy J. Banks, Marshall Not Money Hungry, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 20, 
2002, at 99 (quoting Marshall: “One reason was [that Chicago is] centrally located for 
myself, for my family as well as for [my fiancée’s] family” and, despite passing up $13 
million in leaving the Utah Jazz, “[t]his is a decision that is going to . . . make my 
family happy.”); see also Tim Buckley, No Donyell? Marshall’s Agent Says Talks with 
Jazz Are Stalled, DESERET MORNING NEWS, July 20, 2002, at D1 (citing comments from 
Marshall’s agent that his client was concerned about “quality of life” and that he 
expressed a willingness to accept much less in compensation in order to obtain it 
elsewhere).  The following year, Marshall was traded to the Toronto Raptors.  Roman 
Modrowski, Rose, Davis Headline Bulls-Raptors Trade, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 30, 2003, 
at 114. 
 225 Lacy J. Banks, Harpring Signs with Jazz, CHI. SUN TIMES, Aug. 16, 2002, 
at 143; see also K.C. Johnson, Summer Snub Doesn’t Faze Harpring, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 
24, 2002, at 13 (noting that Harpring also rejected a more lucrative contract to stay 
with the 76ers). 
 226 Larry Weisman, Smerlas, 49ers Agree to Terms, USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 
1990, at 7C.  Although the 49ers’ offer, unlike the offers from the Patriots and Bills, 
contained the prospect of a bonus, it lacked the guarantee and total value of the 
Patriots’ offer, and the Bills’ base salary was higher.  Id.  For those reasons, Smerlas’ 
agent, Jack Mula, acknowledged “we took less money.”  Id. 
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and even though it lacked a guarantee.227  According to his 
representative, Jack Mula, Smerlas valued the “warm weather” 
of San Francisco in distinguishing between the offers.228  
Neither Smerlas nor other professional athletes are especially 
unique in identifying worth in warm weather; scientific data 
suggests seasonal and weather changes may affect mood and 
happiness, thus motivating individuals to pursue settings most 
compatible with weather preferences.229 
Other professional athletes prefer settings that ascribe 
to normative desires, and that also reflect appealing contrasts 
to existing conditions.  For instance, when free agent outfielder 
Kirk Gibson signed with the Kansas City Royals in 1990, he 
declined several offers of greater economic value, reasoning 
that, after three years of living in Los Angeles, he most 
preferred a relaxed setting in a relatively small city.230  
Similarly, he expressly desired an unhurried culture with mid-
west values.231  Gibson’s choice suggests that active agency may 
be fungible, and influenced by mirrored reflections of current 
conditions.  Such a disposition appears corroborative of 
findings that individuals often proscribe value to new settings, 
simply because those settings contrast to existing and 
unfavorable circumstances.232  This is sometimes called the 
“grass is always greener” phenomenon.233 
  
 227 Id.  Unlike in the MLB, the NBA, or the NHL, player contracts in the NFL 
may be non-guaranteed.  See generally Adam W. Heller, Creating a Win-Win Situation 
Through Collective Bargaining: The NFL Salary Cap, 7 SPORTS LAW. J. 375, 389-97 
(2000). 
 228 E-mail from Jack Mula, Chief Administrative Counsel, New England 
Patriots, to the author (Mar. 30, 2005) (on file with author). 
 229 See Leo Sher, Seasons and the Brain, 358 LANCET 2092 (2001) (describing 
research findings pertaining to “seasonal affective disorder,” a disorder causing 
individuals to become depressed when exposed to prolonged cold or dreary weather); 
see also Timo Partonen & Jouko Löonnqvist, Seasonal Affective Disorder, 352 LANCET 
1369 (1998) (recommending greater exposure to warm weather and sunlight as best 
remedies to seasonal affective disorder). 
 230 See Royals Sign Kirk Gibson, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Dec. 1, 1990 (Lexis 
News Wire). 
 231 Id. (quoting Gibson, “I guess I’ve always been kind of a country boy. 
Coming from Los Angeles, I know I’ll never have to sit in six lanes of traffic at 1 o’clock 
in the afternoon to go six miles in 35 minutes.”). 
 232 See, e.g., Barbara Millar, Relocation: Where the Grass Is Always Greener,  
NURS. TIMES, June 14, 2001, at 28, 28-29 (2001) (describing methodology of nurses 
when they seek to move to new hospitals and new cities); Edilberto O. Pelausa, Moving 
to America: Is the Grass Really Greener?, 31 J. OTOLARYNGOLOGY 65, 73-75 (2002) 
(discussing dissonance between expectations and realities for foreign otolaryngologists 
who move to the United States).  
 233 Miller, supra note 232, at 29 (on file with author).  
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The allure of playing on a championship-contending 
team also attracts professional athletes to sacrifice fortune.  
This is especially apparent among those professional athletes 
nearing the end of their careers.  Consider, for instance, the 
decision of unrestricted free agent Alonzo Mourning to sign a 
four-year, $22 million contract with the New Jersey Nets in 
2002.234  Though he was presented with a more lucrative offer 
from the Dallas Mavericks, Mourning believed that playing 
with the Nets would provide a greater probability of winning a 
championship.235  In the twilight of his career, Mourning 
identified particular value in this motivation, as he deemed a 
championship the critically missing piece of his professional 
biography.236  For that reason, Mourning expressed a 
willingness to sacrifice meaningful economic remuneration in 
exchange for enhanced probability of team success.237 
Professional athletes also seek new settings that might 
enhance perceived personality traits.  To illustrate, consider 
the decision-making process of pitcher Eddie Guardado, who, 
as an unrestricted free agent in 2003, opted to sign with the 
Seattle Mariners for less compensation than he was offered by 
teams in larger media markets, including the Boston Red Sox 
and the Chicago Cubs.238  Significantly, Guardado articulated a 
predilection for an environment in which he would “not [be in] 
the limelight.”239  Similarly, he aspired a setting where media 
commentary would prove less hurtful to his family.240  Thus, 
Guardado appeared highly cognizant of the relationship 
between playing environment and happiness, and he placed 
corresponding value in that recognition when choosing between 
offers. 
  
 234 Charlie Nobles, Mourning Shows the Rust, but Dreams About the Ring, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2003, at D2. 
 235 See Mike Celizic, Give Nets Credit for Major Coup, MSNBC SPORTS, July 
11, 2003, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3074478/. 
 236 See Nobles, supra note 234. 
 237 See Celizic, supra note 235 (quoting Mourning: “[I]t’s not just about the 
money . . . .  It’s about winning, too.”).  For a similar instance, consider Brett Hull’s 
decision to sign with the Detroit Red Wings in 2001.  He signed for less because he 
perceived the opportunity to win a Stanley Cup as more valuable than millions extra in 
compensation.  See Hull Joins Hasek, Robitaille in Detroit, ESPN.COM, Aug. 23, 2001, 
http://espn.go.com/nhl/news/2001/0821/1242288.html. 
 238 See Red Sox to Hire Francona Today, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at D2; 
Mike Dodd, Setup Men Face High-Pressure Relief with Low Pay, USA TODAY, Mar. 26, 
2004, at 1C.  Guardado signed a three-year, $13 million contract with the Mariners.  
Dodd, supra, at 1C. 
 239 Dodd, supra note 238, at 1C. 
 240 See Red Sox To Hire Francona Today, supra note 238, at D2. 
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Lastly, by externally imposing alternate preferences, 
the families of professional athletes may also influence 
decision-making of free agent opportunities.  Take, for 
instance, defensive end Sean Jones, who, as an unrestricted 
free agent in 1996, attracted significant interest from NFL 
teams.241  He ultimately chose to sign with the Green Bay 
Packers, even though he was offered more money by other 
teams.242  Jones revealed that his choice was “pretty much [his] 
wife’s decision,” as she required that he to play in a city where 
there would be comparatively few “late night” options for 
players.243  Indeed, Mrs. Jones wanted assurance that her 
husband “would be home at a reasonable time of night.”244 
3. Risk Aversion 
A separate, non-geographic rational preference also 
deserves discussion: risk aversion, or the willingness to pay 
more money (or accept less money) to avoid participation in a 
risky activity, even when the expected value of the activity is 
favorable.245  As captured by the adage, “A bird in hand is worth 
two in the bush,” risk-aversion signifies that the prospect of 
losing a dollar already owned weighs more heavily than the 
chance of gaining a dollar not yet owned.246  More 
  
 241 David Aldridge, Green Bay’s Low-Key High Life; Big-time Athletes Adjust to 
Small Town, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1996, at F3. 
 242 Id.  
 243 Id. 
 244 Id.  For perhaps a similar illustration of familial influence, consider 
remarks by former Boston Red Sox great Johnny Pesky, for whom Fenway Park’s 
“Pesky Pole” is named, concerning his decision to sign with the Red Sox in 1940:  
Back then, you could sign with anybody—there was no draft yet. There were 
a number of teams interested in me, and some offered more money than 
Boston. My mother and father wanted me to sign with the Red Sox, though, 
because their scout brought her flowers when he came to the house—and 
bourbon for my father.  They were immigrants, and even though it was the 
Depression, that was more important than the extra money. I’m glad it 
worked out the way it did. 
David Laurila, Interview with Johnny Pesky, RED SOX NATION, May 29, 2004, 
http://www.redsoxnation.net/forums/index.php?showtopic=5219. 
 245 See RICHARD A. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM 
COMMON STOCKS 47-54 (1969) (explaining the relationship between risk and value); 
Lynn M. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in 
the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE. L.J. 701, 736 (1999) (describing how 
individuals with greater tolerance for risk can reap benefits by accepting risks avoided 
by others). 
 246 See JOHN MUELLER, CAN FINANCIAL ASSETS BEAT SOCIAL SECURITY? NOT 
IN THE REAL WORLD 4 (1997), available at http://heartland.org/pdf/80785B.pdf. See also 
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formalistically then, a risk-averse individual would prefer 
suffering a certain harm of $100 to suffering a harm of $1,000 
with a 10 percent probability of occurring, in spite of their 
identical expected values.247  Such decision-making manifests 
itself across economic, political, and legal spectrums, and 
affects both individual and institutional choices.248 
Professional athletes occasionally evince risk aversion 
in explaining their acquiescence to below-market contract 
offers.  Cleveland Browns quarterback Kelly Holcomb is one 
such player.  Prior to the start of the 2002 NFL season, 
Holcomb served as the primary backup quarterback to starting 
quarterback Tim Couch.249  At that time, Holcomb was 29 years 
old and appeared destined for a career as a backup 
quarterback.250  The Browns offered him a two-year contract 
extension worth nearly $2.2 million251, which essentially 
reflected the going-rate for backup quarterbacks.252   
Significantly, Holcomb was set to become an 
unrestricted free agent at the end of the 2002 season.  
Considering that typically between 10 and 20 percent of 
starting quarterbacks miss more than five games each year due 
to injury, and that a similarly meaningful percentage play 
poorly and are benched, Holcomb, like any backup quarterback, 
  
DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE APPLIED THEORY OF PRICE 65-70 (2d ed. 1985) (providing 
economic description of risk aversion).  
 247 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 961, 1074 (2001) (explaining risk aversion in the insurance context). See also 
Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 IOWA L. REV. 363, 366-
67 (1984) (discussing how risk aversion among townspeople affects their preferences for 
local policies). 
 248 See Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH 
L. REV. 205, 209 (1999) (reconciling risk aversion among criminal defendants with 
insufficient plea bargain offers by prosecution); Albert J. Boro, Jr., Banking Disclosure 
Regimes for Regulating Speculative Behavior, 74 CAL. L. REV. 431, 451 (1986) 
(explaining how fiduciary duties and the threat of legal liability encourages risk 
aversion among institutional investors); David A. Yalof, Dress Rehearsal Politics and 
the Case of Earmarked Judicial Nominees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 691, 697 (2005) 
(discussing risk aversion of President Bill Clinton when selecting judicial nominees for 
federal appellate positions).  
 249 American Football Conference Team Notes, SPORTING NEWS, July 29, 2002, 
at 51. 
 250 Id. (describing Holcomb in rather modest terms, “Kelly Holcomb is a steady 
backup who won’t win games but won’t lose them either”). 
 251 See Mary Kay Cabot, Former Browns Pay Disorderly Conduct Fine, PLAIN 
DEALER, Apr. 30, 2002, at D7 (noting that the contract included a signing bonus of 
$325,000 and base salaries of $825,000 and $975,000, for a total value of $2,175,000).  
 252  See, e.g., Mark Eckel, Brian’s Song, TIMES OF TRENTON, Aug. 7, 2005, at 
C9 (noting that, in 2005, NFL back-up quarterbacks tend to make at least $1.4 million 
per year). 
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could have declined a market-value extension, and chosen 
instead to “gamble” that Couch would either suffer injury or 
play poorly, thus elevating Holcomb to the starting position.253  
Indeed, in light of established NFL precedent, just one start 
may have offered the opportunity to catapult his market value: 
quarterback Rob Johnson had only one start in three seasons 
with the Jacksonville Jaguars between 1996 and 1998, but 
played very well in the start, prompting the Buffalo Bills to 
trade for him, and sign him to a five-year, $25 million 
contract.254 
On the other hand, Holcomb was presented with a 
contract worth almost $2.2 million, and chances were, he would 
not play more than a few plays during the 2002 season, and 
thus not elevate his market value.  Indeed, Couch had proven 
remarkably durable, not missing a single start in the 2001 
season.255  Moreover, Holcomb recognized the prospect of injury 
in practice or otherwise during the 2002 season, and would 
have regretted not signing the extension in the event of such 
occurrence.256  Presented with these risk assessment variables, 
Holcomb elected to sign the contract extension.257 
During the last preseason game for the Browns in 2002, 
Holcomb may have suddenly felt regret.  In that game, Couch 
suffered an elbow injury that would cause him to miss the first 
two games of the regular season.  Holcomb went on to start 
those two games, as well as play in most of the season’s third 
game, and would play extraordinarily well, throwing nine 
touchdowns and just two interceptions, while leading the NFL 
in Quarterback Rating.258  When confronted with speculation as 
  
 253 See, e.g., Will McDonough, Ironic Twists in Bledsoe Saga, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Apr. 28, 2002, at D2 (noting that one or two starting quarterbacks is typically injured 
in the preseason, and that several others tend to “fail miserably”).  
 254 See Larry Weisman, Bills’ Playbook a Work in Progress, USA TODAY, Aug. 
5, 1998, at 10C. 
 255 See ESPN.com, Green Bay Packers, # 2 Tim Couch-QB, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/players /stats?statsId=4649 (last visited Jan. 4, 2006). 
 256 For instance, during the 1994 NFL season, Tampa Bay Buccaneers backup 
quarterback Trent Dilfer was set to ascend to the starting quarterback position, but 
was injured in practice, thus delaying his ascension.  See David Elfin, Growing Pains: 
Rookies Schuler, Dilfer Find Life Tough in NFL, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1994, at C1. 
 257 See Tony Grossi, Holcomb Takes What’s Dealt: Backup Quarterback Doesn’t 
Regret Signing Contract Extension, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 17, 2002, at C14. 
 258 See id.  “Quarterback rating” is a composite statistic based on four criteria: 
1) percentage of completions per attempt; 2) average yards gained per attempt; 
3) percentage of touchdown passes per attempt; and 4) percentage of interceptions per 
attempt.  See NFL Quarterback Rating Formula, NFL News, 
http://www.nfl.com/news/981202qbrate.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).  
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to how much more money he could have earned had he declined 
the contract extension and pursued free agency, Holcomb noted 
a conscious internalization of risk: “It’s that old saying, one 
bird in hand is better than two in the bush.”259  In other words, 
by signing the contract extension, Holcomb prescribed 
subjective value to the nullification of risk, and that subjective 
value was worth more to him than the difference in objective 
value between the contract extension and his prospective free 
agent status, discounted by risk of injury, poor performance, or 
other impairments of play.260 
Risk aversion also emerges when players attempt to 
forecast market changes.  For instance, when former Red Sox 
outfielder Mike Greenwell declined to elect for free agency in 
1994, and instead surprisingly agreed to a two-year, $7.3 
million contract extension, he highlighted a market strategy 
based on his risk preferences.261  Specifically, Greenwell 
anticipated that because of public outrage associated with the 
baseball players’ strike in 1994, fans would soon turn away 
from baseball in droves, thus contracting the value of the game 
and leading to diminished player salaries.262  Consequently, 
Greenwell perceived a discounted contract in an existing 
market as more valuable than a market-value contract in an 
uncertain and future market. 
Unfortunately for Greenwell, his market projections 
would prove largely erroneous.  Even though MLB player 
salaries dipped 1.3 percent from 1994 to 1995,263 they increased 
by 3.5 percent from 1995 to 1996, followed by a 17.0 percent 
surge from 1996 to 1997.264  Nevertheless, his expressed 
  
 259 Id. 
 260 Recent economic analysis suggests that risk aversion among professional 
athletes also affects contracting of off-court responsibilities, such as extent of team 
monitoring of player activities.  See Örn B. Bodvarsson & Raymond T. Brastow, Do 
Employers Pay for Consistent Performance?: Evidence from the NBA, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 
145, 152-58 (1998).  
 261 See Greenwell Remains in Red Sox Tradition, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1994, 
at B12. 
 262 See Nick Cafardo, Greenwell Not Holding a Grudge, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 
3, 1995, at 46 (quoting Greenwell: “People were wondering . . . why I took the offer they 
made.  Well, I’m not that stupid.  I’m a little smarter than people think.  I knew what 
was coming.  Right now, I’m extremely happy I signed the contract that I did when I 
did.”). 
 263 See Baseball Salary Decline, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1995, at D6 (also noting 
that while many players took pay cuts following the strike of 1994, the top stars 
continued to observe their salaries surge considerably).   
 264 See Erik Brady & David Leon Moore, Big Sports, Bigger Bucks: Just How 
High Can Players’ Salaries Go?, USA TODAY, Apr. 3, 1997, at 1A. 
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rationale for negotiating a below-market value contract 
extension suggested a conscious, tactical strategy based on risk 
preferences. 
C. Evidence of Cognitive Biases and Heuristics 
The preceding subsection described alternative 
preferences among professional athletes when contemplating 
employment opportunities.  In doing so, it largely endorsed 
rational choice theory: individuals appear to rank preferences, 
and then, as reflected in their choices, maximize those 
preferences in their decision-making process.  Thus, when 
professional athletes choose a “discount” offer, it simply reflects 
a conscious ranking of non-monetary preferences ahead of 
remunerative preferences.   
Doubtless, a rational choice model strikes an appealing 
rubric, since it more broadly suggests that individuals act 
rationally when making decisions, and that such decisions 
reflect conscious preferences.  Moreover, given societal 
skepticism towards the intellectual capacity of most 
professional athletes,265 typical individuals might infer 
confidence from the capacity of professional athletes to engage 
in rational decision-making.  In short, based on the rational-
choices of professional athletes, individuals appear to possess 
not only the capacity to navigate through difficult professional 
decisions, but also the tendency to select the “optimal” choice.  
This analysis, however, is incomplete.  Indeed, as 
discussed in Section III, cognitive biases and heuristics, 
unbeknownst to decision-makers, frequently disturb decision-
making processes.  Perhaps then it should come as no surprise 
that professional athletes appear likewise influenced by choice 
distortions. 
1. Framing Effects 
Framing effects suggest that varied wording of equally-
valuable options can induce individuals into valuing them 
differently.266  How might framing effects influence professional 
  
 265 See Timothy Davis, The Myth of the Superspade: The Persistence of Racism 
in College Athletics, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615, 631 (1995) (describing how, even when 
they evince high intellectual capacity, collegiate athletes are frequently discouraged by 
scholastic advisors from taking “hard” classes, and instead enrolled in less burdensome 
courses). 
 266 See discussion supra p. 1470 and accompanying notes.  
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athletes when selecting employment opportunities?  Consider 
the influence of team negotiators, such as general managers or 
owners, and how some adroitly utilize invention, red herrings, 
and props to spawn illusory distinctions. 
Framing effects among professional teams are especially 
evident in the NBA, where salaries have maximum limits, 
meaning that teams often extend identical offers to premiere 
free agents.267  Without the potential of distinguishing financial 
terms, NBA teams routinely employ aggressive recruiting 
tactics, and these tactics sometimes amplify trivial distinctions.  
For instance, when the Chicago Bulls courted unrestricted free 
agents in the summer of 2001, they arranged for a band, 
assorted mascots, and numerous front office officials to greet 
each player upon his arrival at O’Hare International Airport.268  
Bulls’ general manager Jerry Krause had hoped that such a 
marketing strategy would frame the Bulls as a franchise of 
particular “substance” and player care.269  
Similarly, to promote distinction in relative levels of 
interest, NBA general managers are known to call free agents 
at the very first moment when teams are allowed to contact 
free agents.  This moment usually occurs at 12:01 A.M. of an 
early July morning.270  Occasionally, this strategy appears 
influential in free agents’ decision-making.  For instance, in 
explaining his decision to sign with the New York Knicks in 
2004, free agent guard Jamal Crawford highlighted an 
enthusiastic phone call that he had received from New York 
Knicks’ general manager Isiah Thomas at the very first 
moment when teams could contact free agents.271  Crawford 
  
 267 See discussion supra pp. 1488-89 and accompanying notes.  
 268 See Lacy J. Banks, Krause Made the Right Call Targeting Jones, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, July 14, 2000, at 138. 
 269 Id.  This strategy did not work, however, as none of the five primary free 
agents Krause pursued (i.e., Tim Duncan, Tracy McGrady, Grant Hill, Eddie Jones, 
and Tim Thomas) signed with the Bulls, and they instead chose identical offers from 
other teams.  See Fred Mitchell, Local Agent Discounts Talk of Anti-Bulls Conspiracy, 
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 2000, at N3. 
 270 This date varies, depending upon the NBA calendar, but usually occurs 
between July 1 and July 15. 
 271 See Mike Lupica, Isiah Giving Crawford His Shot to Score with Fans, 
DAILY NEWS (New York), Nov. 3, 2004, at 74.  Perhaps more often, however, this 
strategy proves immaterial.  See, e.g., Mark Montieth, O’Neal to Visit Spurs, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 2, 2003, at 1D (noting that although Isiah Thomas personally 
called unrestricted free agents Jermaine O’Neal and Reggie Miller, neither of them 
signed with the Knicks); Liz Robbins, Kidd’s a Free Agent, and Phones Ring, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 2, 2003, at D6 (describing unsuccessful efforts by the Dallas Mavericks and 
San Antonio Spurs to recruit free agent Jason Kidd, and that such efforts entailed 
calling him at 12:01 A.M.). 
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regarded the call as instrumental in helping him distinguish 
between identical offers.272 
Framing effects also emerge in other professional sports 
contexts, albeit more conjecturally.  For instance, when the 
New York Mets successfully pursued free agent pitcher Pedro 
Martinez in 2004, Mets’ general manager Omar Minaya is 
thought to have intimated to Martinez that since he, like 
Martinez, was of Dominican descent, Martinez could “trust” 
him more than Theo Epstein, Minaya’s counterpart on the 
Boston Red Sox and for whom Martinez had been playing.273  
Such fact patterns undermine the rational choice model, and 
suggest that choices may not reflect a pristine maximization of 
utility or relative strength of preferences, but rather 
vulnerability to unappreciated factors, such as sales pitches 
and manipulative overtures. 
2. Confirmation Bias 
Similarly influential is the effect of confirmation bias, 
whereby individuals are subject to ignore or discount 
information that challenges existing beliefs.274  This disposition 
occasionally arises when professional athletes encounter a 
uniquely positive experience on a particular team, and are 
thereafter prone to positively interpret ambiguous 
circumstances and to dismiss negative associations.  Since they 
are prone to misinterpret signals and cues, professional 
athletes affected by confirmation bias may unknowingly 
dismiss salient—and thus valuable—distinguishing 
characteristics. 
  
 272 Lupica, supra note 270, at 74. 
 273 See Filip Bondy, Pedro Plays N.Y. Way in City, Everyone Has Own Set of 
Rules, DAILY NEWS (New York), Dec. 17, 2004, at 104; see also Gordon Edes, Martinez 
Is Starting Already in Mets Camp, He’s Starting Already!, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 
2005, at F1 (citing remarks by Martinez that he gave his word to Minaya while he 
could not do the same to Epstein, who he believed—in spite of facts supporting the 
opposite conclusion—was not genuinely interested in re-signing him). 
 274 See Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 16, 
at 647-50.  A corollary to confirmation bias is “self-serving” or “egocentric” biases, 
whereby individuals interpret information in a way that disproportionately favors their 
own position.  Unlike confirmation bias, however, self-serving or egocentric biases are 
likely consciously present.  See Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation, supra note 55, 
at 206 n.199 (noting that these biases may increase plaintiffs’ risk in seeking frivolous 
litigation); see also Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining 
Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON PERSPECTIVES 109 (1997) 
(discussing the impact of self-serving biases on settlements). 
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To illustrate, consider the events that led to Jermaine 
O’Neal’s decision to re-sign with the Indiana Pacers in 2003.  
O’Neal’s NBA career began in 1996, when he was drafted by 
the Portland Trailblazers.275  After four unspectacular seasons, 
O’Neal was traded to the Pacers.276  As a Pacer, O’Neal 
developed a close bond with head coach Isiah Thomas, who 
devoted much of his time to O’Neal and helped him become a 
star.  In fact, O’Neal would call Thomas his “father figure.”277  
Besides his on-court instruction, Thomas would also serve 
O’Neal as an emotional buffer, as best evidenced by Thomas’ 
counseling of O’Neal after the player’s stepfather attempted 
suicide by shooting himself in the head—in O’Neal’s presence—
in 2002.278   
The O’Neal-Thomas relationship emerged as mutually 
beneficial.  Indeed, O’Neal would often rush to the defense of 
Thomas, whose coaching strategies were widely-criticized and 
whose teams often appeared underachieving.279  For instance, 
when doubts were raised of Thomas’ competence, O’Neal would 
regularly characterize his coach as a victim of unrealistic 
expectations, saddled by prior management decisions that 
created an on-going re-building process.280  Such comments 
bewildered many observers, as the Pacers were generally 
regarded as one of the league’s most talented teams, and one 
  
 275 See Ken Vance, Blazers President Not Afraid of Change, COLUMBIAN 
(Vancouver, WA), June 30, 1996, at C1. 
 276 See Brian Meehan, O’Neal Becoming a Force on the Court for Indiana, 
OREGONIAN, Nov. 26, 2000, at C11. 
 277 See Lacy Banks, Pacers in Limbo After Firing Thomas, CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
Aug. 29, 2003, at 166 (quoting O’Neal: “[Thomas] was more than a coach to me.  He 
was like a father.”); Mark Montieth, Lineup Shuffle Puts Strickland on Court, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 7, 2003, at 4D (quoting O’Neal: “It’s like a father-son 
relationship”); Christian Red, O’Neal Gets Over Axing of Thomas, DAILY NEWS (New 
York), Feb. 4, 2004, at 48.  
 278 See Sekou Smith, Rising to the Occasion, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 25, 
2003, at 1D (describing how Thomas went to the emergency room to counsel O’Neal the 
night of his step-father’s attempted suicide). 
 279 See Bob Ryan, As Game 5 Beckons, Consider These Salient Topics on the 
Indiana-Boston Series 5 Points—Ok, Actually Five Observations on Basketball with a 
Bonus Entertainment Topic Thrown In, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 29, 2003, at F1 
(describing the Pacers as one of the worst-coached teams in the NBA, particularly with 
their bizarre substitution patterns); see also Steve Bulpett, Celts Earn Playoff Berth by 
Default, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 12, 2004, at 82 (criticizing Thomas for his coaching 
strategies against inferior Celtics teams that nevertheless beat the Thomas-coached 
Pacers). 
 280 See Mark Monteith, O’Neal: I’ll Play Only for Thomas, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, 
May 2, 2003, at 1D (quoting O’Neal: “This is still a learning process.  Isiah’s got a team 
competing at a high level with a lot of guys who hadn’t played in the past. Isiah 
inherited a team that he didn’t put together but he’s winning with it.”). 
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led by seasoned veterans, such as Reggie Miller and Brad 
Miller; a “rebuilding team” they were not.281 
The 2002-03 season would prove to be a pivotal one for 
the O’Neal-Thomas relationship.  First, consider that the 
Pacers lost 19 of their last 30 regular season games, and then, 
in a dismal showing, lost to the Boston Celtics in the first 
round of the 2003 NBA Playoffs.282  Following the playoff series, 
media and even Pacers’ players harshly criticized Thomas for 
his coaching strategies.283  Then, in May 2003, Pacers team 
president Donnie Walsh announced that Thomas would not 
receive a contract extension, a significant proclamation 
considering that Thomas had only one year left on his four-year 
contract, and a team declination of a coaching extension 
typically foretells a forthcoming coaching dismissal.284 
Only making matters more dubious for Thomas, in early 
July 2003, the Pacers hired a new president of basketball 
operations, Larry Bird—a personal and professional archrival 
of Thomas—who immediately announced major organizational 
changes on the horizon.285  Along those lines, speculation 
quickly arose that Bird would replace Thomas with Rick 
Carlisle, Bird’s close friend and former Detroit Pistons’ head 
coach.286  In fact, only a year earlier, Bird had opined that if 
Carlisle, rather than Thomas, were the Pacers’ coach, the team 
would “be 10 to 20 percent better.”287  Accordingly, by all 
objective measures, the future of Thomas as Pacers’ head coach 
appeared very bleak in July 2003.  
For O’Neal, Thomas’ impending demise proved of great 
relevance, as he was set to become an unrestricted free agent 
  
 281 See, e.g., Al Iannazzone, Isiah Pining for Pacers, THE RECORD (Bergen 
County, NJ), Feb. 3, 2004, at S6 (describing Pacers 2002-03 squad as one that, “by most 
accounts, underachieved”); Doug Smith, Raptors “Open to All Discussions” at Draft, 
HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Ontario, Canada), May 28, 2003, at E5 (describing Pacers as 
“underachieving”). 
 282 See Peter May, Doubts on Thomas, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2003, at F8. 
 283 Id. (identifying complaints among players concerning unpredictable 
substitution patterns, with players receiving significant minutes in one game, and then 
no minutes in the next). 
 284 Id. 
 285 See Sekou Smith, Off and Running: Bird Identifies Pacers’ Faults, Wants 
Solutions, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 12, 2003, at 1D [hereinafter Smith, Off and 
Running]. 
 286 See Mark Monteith, “Isiah Thomas Is the Coach”; Carlisle Says He’s 
Pursuing TV Analyst Jobs, Not Pacers’ Position, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 13, 2003, at 
5C. 
 287 See Jackie MacMullan, For Playoffs, Bird Still a Green Backer, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Apr. 18, 2002, at E1. 
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on July 1, 2003.288  Despite Thomas’ precarious status, O’Neal 
expressed interest in re-signing with the Pacers, but as a 
precondition, he insisted that Thomas remain the coach.289  In 
response, Bird stated only that he had no immediate plans to 
make a coaching change, which O’Neal interpreted as 
unwavering confidence by Bird in Thomas.290  In contrast, most 
observers not only interpreted Bird’s comments as lukewarm 
support, but that Thomas would be retained only until O’Neal 
re-signed or signed elsewhere.291  Nevertheless, O’Neal chose to 
re-sign with the Pacers—a mere five days after Bird’s hiring.292   
Less than a month later, Bird fired Thomas as head 
coach, and replaced him with Carlisle.293  Observers described 
the move as one of the most predictable coaching changes in 
recent NBA history.294  O’Neal perceived it a bit differently.  He 
expressed shock and displeasure, and claimed that he had been 
“deceived” by Bird into signing the contract extension.295  He 
also stated that he would not have re-signed had he known 
that Thomas was going to be fired.296 
O’Neal’s decision-making process appeared strikingly 
incongruous with both available information and his stipulated 
preferences for re-signing with the Pacers.  Along those lines, 
O’Neal appeared to discount myriad informational sources that 
challenged his core belief, namely that Thomas would remain 
as his head coach, mentor, and father-figure.  Even arguably 
ambiguous information, such as speculation of Bird’s fondness 
  
 288 See David DuPree, Big Names Are in Position for Free-Agent Free-for-All, 
USA TODAY, July 1, 2003, at 6C. 
 289 See Mark Monteith, Pacers’ Star Player Welcomes New Boss, INDIANAPOLIS 
STAR, July 12, 2003, at 8D [hereinafter Monteith, Pacers’ Star Welcomes New Boss]. 
 290 Monteith, Pacers’ Star Player Welcomes New Boss, supra note 289; Smith, 
Off and Running, supra note 285. 
 291 See, e.g., Jemal Horton, Bird and Thomas See a Future Together, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 12, 2003, at 1A (noting “myriad reasons to figure that 
Thomas’ days as the Pacers’ head coach were numbered”). 
 292 Mark Monteith, O’Neal Makes It Official: Pacers Forward Signs Huge 7-
Year Contract, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 17, 2003, at 1D. 
 293 See Dave Lewandowski, Isiah Ousted, Carlisle Courted, INDIANAPOLIS 
STAR, Aug. 28, 2003, at 1A.  
 294 See, e.g., Michael Lee, Inside the NBA, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 29, 2003, 
(regarding move as not surprising to any objective observer); Tom Enlund, Carlisle 
Clearly Was Saving Himself for Pacers All Along, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 7, 
2003, at 19C (stating that Thomas’ “days with the team were numbered” following the 
hiring of Bird). 
 295 See Bob Kravitz, O’Neal Could Have Handled the Truth, INDIANAPOLIS 
STAR, Aug. 29, 2003, at 1D. 
 296 See Patrick Hruby, Coming Attractions; NBA Ready to Go Reel-to-Reel in 
2003-04, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2003, at C1. 
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for Carlisle, was dismissed by O’Neal with ease.  Thus, O’Neal 
appeared to unknowingly impair his own capacity to maximize 
choice: though he enunciated meaningful subjective value in 
playing for the Pacers only if Thomas was the coach, he either 
disregarded or misread evidence indicating that Thomas would 
not be the coach.  Thus, when Thomas was dismissed, such 
impairment of preference-maximization dismayed O’Neal, as 
he had unknowingly suppressed the internalization of salient 
and distinguishing characteristics. 
3. Optimism Bias 
Optimism bias likewise provides a useful mode of 
heuristic analysis by which to gauge decision-making among 
professional athletes, and how they may not always utilize 
rational choice.  As discussed in Section III, optimism bias 
reflects the tendency of individuals to assume that general 
risks do not apply with equal force to themselves.297  Thus, 
when contemplating employment opportunities, might 
professional athletes overestimate the probability of positive 
outcomes and underestimate the probability of negative 
outcomes? 
Evidence for optimism bias sometimes emerges when 
professional athletes weigh the relative risk of incentive-laden 
contracts versus guaranteed contracts, with the former 
naturally offering greater potential for reward—and loss.  For 
instance, consider the choice of New Orleans Saints’ running 
back Ricky Williams in 1999 to agree to an eight-year contract 
worth between $11 million and $68 million, depending upon his 
capacity to reach certain incentives.298  At the time, Williams 
was the fifth overall selection in the 1999 NFL Draft and was 
negotiating his first NFL contract.  As a useful juxtaposition to 
Williams’ decision-making process, consider that of fellow 
rookie running back Edgerrin James, who was selected by the 
Indianapolis Colts with the fourth overall selection and was 
likewise negotiating his first NFL contract.299  In striking 
contrast to Williams’ incentive-laden contract, James agreed to 
a seven-year contract worth between $44 million and $49 
  
 297 See discussion supra pp. 1471-72. 
 298 Mark Wiedmer, Maybe Ricky Should Lose Master P, CHATTANOOGA TIMES 
FREE PRESS, Aug. 26, 1999, at D1. 
 299 See id. 
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million, with incentives primarily affecting Williams’ potential 
to void the last year of the contract.300   
For two players selected at almost the same point in the 
NFL Draft, the Williams and James contracts appeared of 
exceptionally disparate values.  In fact, performance 
projections estimated that Williams would earn at least $30 
million less than James over the course of the contract.301  
Indeed, for Williams to obtain much of his annual salary, he 
needed to amass at least 1,600 rushing yards each season, a 
feat that had only been accomplished by 15 players in the 
NFL’s 134-year history, and only once by a Saints’ running 
back in the franchise’s 33-year history.302  As a result of his 
apparent “bad gamble,” Williams bore the brunt of considerable 
ridicule.303 
In explaining his decision, Williams reasoned that 
because he believed that he should have been the number one 
overall selection in the NFL Draft—and thus have warranted a 
more lucrative contract—the only way for him “to make that 
kind of money” was to agree to such a heavily-leveraged 
contract.304  As to the contract’s seemingly quixotic performance 
thresholds, Williams appeared undeterred, reasoning that if he 
performed to his potential, he would readily attain them.305  
Further suggestive of optimism bias, Williams maintained this 
confidence even after seriously spraining his ankle a week prior 
to the start of his rookie season.306  Separately, Williams 
rationalized the contract by stating that he would use off-field 
promotional earnings to offset any opportunity costs triggered 
  
 300 See News Summaries, Colts Sign James to Seven-Year Deal, SPORTS 
NETWORK, Aug. 13, 1999.   
 301 See Wiedmer, supra note 297.  See also Peter King, Inside the NFL, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 23, 1999, at 48 (noting that, based on probable performance, James 
would likely earn $11 million more than Williams over their first three seasons). 
 302 King, supra note 301, at 48; Rick Reilly, Ricky Williams, You Got Taken, 
but Good, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 9, 1999, at 100 (describing the contract as the 
worst contract in NFL history). 
 303 See, e.g., Ron Borges, Williams Giving Saints, Fans New Incentive, BOSTON 
GLOBE, June 20, 1999, at D4 (noting ridicule from agents); Reilly, supra note 302, at 
100; Michael Silver, Rappin’ on the Door, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 19, 1999, at 82 
(citing mocking commentary from agents and NFL executives of the contract). 
 304 See Camping with Ricky, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 5, 1999, at 
D2. 
 305 Id. 
 306 See Don Pierson, Williams, Saints Go Limping In, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 27, 
1999, at N1 (citing remarks by Williams that he believed he would obtain the 1,600-
rushing-yard-per-season milestone even if he missed two out of the sixteen regular 
season games). 
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by unobtainable incentives (without apparently realizing that 
such off-field earnings would have been available irrespective 
of contract type).307   
As predicted by most observers, Williams’ decision 
proved remarkably unwise.  Though he ranked among the top 
10 running backs in rushing yards during his first three 
seasons, he failed to reach most of the onerous performance 
standards necessary for incentive payment.  As a result, he 
earned far below his market value.308  This proved most evident 
in his third season, when despite setting his franchise’s fourth-
highest single-season record for rushing yards, and despite 
being named his team’s “most valuable player,” he earned only 
$389,000.309  To put this figure in perspective, consider that 
thirty-three of his fifty Saints’ teammates earned more that 
season,310 or that James—who rushed for fewer yards—earned 
slightly more than $7 million.311 
The costly effect of Williams’ optimism bias begs an 
important question for assessing decision-making among 
professional athletes:  How can player representatives diminish 
optimism bias and other cognitive biases when their clients 
seek patently unfavorable terms? 
In the case of Williams, a fatal negotiating defect may 
have existed to prevent such diminishment, as his 
representative, Percy Miller, had never before represented a 
professional football player.312  Indeed, Miller himself appeared 
the victim of optimism bias, as he dauntlessly assigned the 
drafting of technical, contractual language to a personal aide 
who had never before drafted a contract.313  Nevertheless, more 
seasoned agents may prove capable in discouraging players 
from desiring detrimental agreements.314  In the alternative, 
  
 307 See Kevin B. Blackistone, Give Saints’ Williams Credit for His Play-for-Pay 
Contract, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 15, 1999, at 5B (quoting Williams: “I’m going 
to make a lot of money off the field, and I can use that as my salary.”). 
 308 See Silver, supra note 303. 
 309 See Brad Townsend, Unmasked: His Social Phobia in the Open, Williams 
Tries to Pull off Move, Dallas Morning News, Aug. 12, 2002, at 1B.  See also New 
Orleans Saints Total Rushing Records, http://www.neworleanssaints.com/ 
custompage.cfm?pageid=72 (last visited Jan. 4, 2006). 
 310 See Townsend, supra note 309. 
 311 Id.; USA Today Salary Database: Edgerrin James, Dec. 10, 2003, 
http://asp.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/salaries/playerdetail.aspx?lname=J&player=
1162. 
 312 See Reilly, supra note 302. 
 313 See Silver, supra note 303 (describing work by Leland Hardy). 
 314 See generally Willenbacher, supra note 142 (discussing norms for agent 
behavior). 
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and as vividly illustrated by Williams, professional athletes 
may fail to internalize critical components of the decision-
making process, and thus ultimately pursue the non-optimal 
strategy. 
4. Hindsight Bias and Regret Aversion 
Hindsight bias also appears salient in the decision-
making of professional athletes.  As discussed in Section III, 
hindsight bias refers to the tendency to overestimate 
anticipated fruition of a particular event.315  In the context of 
professional sports, hindsight bias may arise when athletes 
accept “hometown discounts” for unrealized reasons and then 
later rationalize those contracts on the occurrence of 
unanticipated events.   
To illustrate, consider the varying, and potentially 
competing rationales offered by John Flaherty in 1999, and 
then in 2002, regarding his decision to sign a discounted 
contract extension with the Tampa Devil Rays.  The narrative 
begins in 1999, when Flaherty weighed whether to sign a 
three-year, $9 million contract extension or enter free agency.  
On one hand, Flaherty could have entered free agency as one of 
the premiere catchers available, and able to secure a contract 
far in excess of a three-year, $9 million term.316  Moreover, at 
age 31, and after a career of relatively modest earnings, 
Flaherty may have viewed free agency as a singular earnings 
opportunity.317  Indeed, until an unusually impressive 1999 
season, Flaherty had primarily served as a back-up player who 
had earned not much more than the major league minimum.318 
On the other hand, Flaherty perceived subjective value 
in playing on a winning team, with veteran star players, and in 
a regularly sold-out home stadium.319  According to Flaherty, 
  
 315 See discussion supra pp. 1474-75. 
 316 See Marc Topkin, Flaherty Signs on for One More Hitch with Devil Rays, 
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 28, 1999, at 1C.  See also John Romano, Flaherty Earns 
Chance with Another Team, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 20, 2002, at 1C (revealing 
commentary from Devil Rays’ officials that they thought Flaherty was “selling himself 
short” by agreeing to the extension, and when he did, they “congratulated themselves 
on tying up an important position on the field at a reasonable salary”). 
 317 See Topkin, supra note 316. 
 318 See Bob Dick, Flaherty Becomes Big Hit, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 6, 1996, at 
1D (discussing Flaherty’s struggles); Kevin Wells, Flaherty Impressive on, off Field, 
TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 30, 1997, at 11 (discussing success of Flaherty in the 1996 and 
particularly 1997 seasons). 
 319 See Topkin, supra note 316, at 1C. 
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those characteristics appeared associable with the Devil Rays, 
as the team had recently re-signed star first baseman Fred 
McGriff and had expressed interest in obtaining other star 
players.320  Thus Flaherty predicted the Devil Rays would 
excel.321  Indeed, Flaherty praised the “commitment” evidenced 
by both Devil Rays’ management and ownership in developing 
a “championship” strategy.322  Taking account of these reasons, 
Flaherty found the Devil Rays’ contract offer sufficiently 
attractive, and despite its sub-market value, opted to sign it.323 
Unfortunately for Flaherty, the Devils Ray would not 
win many games from 2000 to 2002.  In fact, not only did the 
Devil Rays place last in their division in each of those seasons, 
but from 2001 to 2002, the team compiled the worst record of 
any of the 30 major league teams.324  Moreover, despite 
promises of pursuing star players, the Devil Rays featured the 
lowest payroll in baseball from 2000 to 2002.325  Not 
surprisingly then, the team attracted minimal fan interest, and 
because of poor revenue, even encountered difficulty meeting 
payroll commitments.326  In short, the subjective value Flaherty 
attributed to playing on a winning team, and one with star 
players and devoted fans, never materialized over the course of 
his contract.  
During the 2002 season—which represented the third 
and final year of Flaherty’s contract—Flaherty was asked 
whether he regretted signing the contract extension.  After-all, 
his stated reasons for accepting a “hometown” discount never 
materialized.  Perhaps surprisingly, Flaherty expressed no 
regret.327  Instead, he inferred that upon signing the contract, 
he had looked forward to serving as a mentor to young and 
inexperienced players, since he anticipated that such activities 
would prove valuable to him.328  Thus, Flaherty offered an 
  
 320 Id. 
 321 Id. 
 322 Id. 
 323 See Bill Chastain, Flaherty in the Fold, TAMPA TRIB., Sept. 28, 1999, at 5. 
 324 See Dick Scanlon, Piniella Set to Captain Devil Ray’s Shaky Ship, LEDGER 
(Lakeland, Fla.), Oct. 29, 2002, at A1. 
 325 See Chris Anderson, Sweet Lou Is Home, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Oct. 29, 
2002, at C1. 
 326 See Carter Gaddis & Joe Henderson, Naimoli: Rays Won’t Miss Making 
Payroll, TAMPA TRIB., May 13, 2001, at 1. 
 327 See Romano, supra note 316, at 1C (quoting Flaherty: “Do I regret signing 
that contract?  Hell no.”). 
 328 See Carter Gaddis, Veterans Bring Wisdom to Rays, TAMPA TRIB., Sept. 22, 
2002, at 5 (quoting Flaherty: “I will look forward to the day when a winner does show 
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entirely different subjective rationale for signing a sub-market 
value contract than he had expressed in 1999.  Beyond its 
variance, such a rationale was likely incompatible, as seldom 
do winning teams with veteran star players feature young and 
inexperienced players.329 
As illustrated by Flaherty, hindsight bias may distort 
one’s capacity to objectively evaluate prior decision-making and 
pursuit of preferences.  As a result, it may impair redress of 
any defects within the decision-making process, a troubling 
outcome for athletes since many enter into subsequent series of 
negotiations.  This phenomenon is only exacerbated by regret 
aversion, or the tendency among those prone to hindsight bias 
to resist information concerning forgone conclusions or 
hypothetical outcomes.330  Indeed, regret aversion offers further 
explanation for Flaherty’s unwillingness to acknowledge regret 
and for his substituted rationales: by shifting discussion from 
preferable and forgone alternatives to inferior and existing 
circumstances, Flaherty avoided discussion of information that 
might have triggered feelings of regret and unhappiness.  
Prescriptively then, while hindsight bias offered Flaherty an 
alternative rationale, regret aversion offered the means by 
which to discuss it. 
5. Anchoring and Adjustment Effects 
The failure to adjust for new information may also 
impair rational-decision making among professional athletes.  
As discussed in Section III, psychologists often describe this 
tendency as “anchoring and adjustment” or “belief 
perseverance.”331  In professional sports, athletes negotiating 
contracts sometimes appear anchored to certain monetary 
values, particularly when negotiations occur during market 
fluctuations.  Such anchoring may not only promote 
acrimonious negotiations, but also inferior outcomes. 
To illustrate, consider the futile efforts of shortstop 
Nomar Garciaparra and the Boston Red Sox to consummate a 
contract extension during the 2003 and 2004 MLB seasons.  
  
up out on that field and I’ll feel like in a small way . . . not that I’m part of it, but it’ll be 
very gratifying to see.”). 
 329 See, e.g., Joe Strauss, Hitting the Road, Eyeing Direction, BALT. SUN, July 
12, 2001, at 1D (discussing difficulties of winning with young and inexperienced 
players). 
 330 See discussion supra p. 1475. 
 331 See discussion supra p. 1477. 
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The genesis of those negotiations traces back to March 1998, 
when, as second-year player, Garciaparra agreed to a five-year 
contract with the Red Sox that included team options for the 
2003 and 2004 seasons.332  All together, the contract offered to 
pay Garciaparra $44 million between 1998 and 2004.333  At the 
time, observers regarded the contract as highly generous for a 
player of his experience, though its length also posed risk to 
Garciaparra, particularly given the rapid growth of player 
salaries in the late 1990s.334  Moreover, by enabling the Red Sox 
to control his rights in the 2003 and 2004 seasons, Garciaparra 
surrendered two years in which he could have elected to 
become a free agent.335 
By 2000, Garciaparra, Alex Rodriguez of the Seattle 
Mariners, and Derek Jeter of the New York Yankees, were 
widely-regarded as the three best shortstops in baseball.336  
Indeed, because of their similar talent, production, and age, 
they were often clustered together in baseball discussion.337  
However, between the 2000 and 2001 seasons, the three would 
become compensated at highly variable levels.  Indeed, 
Rodriguez would sign a 10-year, $252 million free agent 
contract with the Texas Rangers,338 and Jeter—who was set to 
become a free agent at the end of the 2001 season—would 
agree to a 10-year, $189 million contract extension with the 
New York Yankees.339  In contrast, Garciaparra would remain 
under contract to the Red Sox through 2004, during which time 
he would earn $32 million.340  Observers immediately described 
Garciaparra as wildly underpaid, because despite their similar 
  
 332 See Michael Silverman & Tony Massarotti, Nomar on the Money, BOSTON 
HERALD, March 11, 1998, at 100. 
 333 Id. 
 334 See Sean McAdam, Garciaparra Gets a $23.5 Million Pact, PROVIDENCE J.-
BULL., Mar. 11, 1998, at 1D. 
 335 Id.  
 336 See, e.g., Larry Lage, Deivi Cruz Not Known for Control, SOUTH BEND 
TRIB., Mar. 1, 2001, at B1 (describing the three best shortstops as Rodriguez, Jeter, 
and Garciaparra). 
 337 Id. 
 338 See Jay Weiner, Good for A-Rod, Bad for Baseball, BUS. WEEK, Dec. 18, 
2000, at 59. 
 339 See Brad Biggs, Millions Not Enough: Latest Contracts Have Spawned 
Disgruntlement Among Stars Stuck in Long-Term Deals, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 26, 
2001, at 89. 
 340 See Silverman & Massarotti, supra note 332, at 100. 
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talent, production, and age, Rodriguez and Jeter would earn 
three to four times as much.341   
Unfortunately for Garciaparra, the exorbitant contracts 
secured by Rodriguez and Jeter likely represented the apex of a 
prior market.  Indeed, the sheer size of such contracts is 
thought to have triggered a backlash among MLB owners, 
which subsequently diminished their willingness to spend so 
unreservedly.342  Consequently, over the following two years, 
free agents tended to secure significantly less lucrative 
contracts than they would have previously secured.343   
Undeterred by this apparent market contraction, 
Garciaparra approached the Red Sox in March 2003 about a 
contract extension that would pay him commensurate with 
Rodriguez and Jeter.344  In fact, since the Rodriguez and Jeter 
contracts paid annual average salaries of $25.2 million and 
$18.9 million, respectively, Garciaparra informed the Red Sox 
that he would accept no less than $17.0 million per year.345  Red 
Sox management had a different idea of Garciaparra’s value, 
however, reasoning that the Rodriguez and Jeter contracts no 
longer represented market value for premiere shortstops.346  
Indeed, as Red Sox management noted, no player, of any 
position, had signed a contract paying in excess of $15 million 
per season during the previous two years.347  Instead of meeting 
Garciaparra’s demand, the Red Sox offered him a four-year 
  
 341 See, e.g., Jon Heyman, These Two Red Sox Are Exceptions to the Rule, 
NEWSDAY (New York), Feb. 28, 2001, at A71; Bob Hohler, Martinez Extends Advice to 
Duquette, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 23, 2000, at F3; Michael Silverman, Sox Cash In—Get 
Off Cheap with Nomar, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 20, 2000, at 88. 
 342 See Tom Haudricourt, Huge Salaries Not Trickling Down to Journeymen 
Players, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 3, 2002, at 15C (describing market correction 
during off season between 2001 and 2002 seasons); Mike Klis, This Time, Collusion Too 
Tough to Unearth Superstar’s Big Contracts, DENVER POST, Feb. 2, 2003, at C5 (noting 
sentiment among free agent players that the owners were colluding to create a market 
correction during off season between 2002 and 2003 seasons). 
 343 Klis, supra note 342.  See also Hal Bodley, 94 Strike: Lesson Learned?, USA 
TODAY, Sept. 13, 2004, at 1D (noting that from 2002 to 2003, free agent salaries 
declined by 3 percent). 
 344 See Michael Silverman, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do, SPORTING NEWS, Aug. 
2, 2004, at 10 (discussing “failed contract negotiations” between Garciaparra and the 
Red Sox during spring training in 2003). 
 345 See Jeff Horrigan, Sox Upped the Ante, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 4, 2004, at 
90; see also Tony Massarotti, Nomar: I Want to Stay, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 8, 2003, at 
120 (citing salaries for Rodriguez and Jeter). 
 346 See Gerry Callahan, Trade a Necessary Evil, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 10, 
2003, at B13 (noting how Red Sox team President Larry Lucchino hoped to convince 
Garciaparra of the “new economic climate” in baseball (i.e., lower salaries)). 
 347 See Horrigan, Sox Upped the Ante, supra note 345, at 90. 
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contract worth $15 million per year.348  According to Red Sox 
owner John Henry, Garciaparra immediately rejected the offer, 
believing that the alleged market correction was either untrue 
or ephemeral.349  Garciaparra would then play the 2003 season 
often appearing unhappy, and his Red Sox teammates believed 
that his contract status had caused him to become increasingly 
irritated.350   
In November 2003, the Red Sox once again offered 
Garciaparra a four-year contract, yet this time it offered an 
average annual salary of only $12 million.351  In explaining the 
reduction in annual value from $15 million to $12 million, Red 
Sox management cited a continuing “market adjustment” that 
had further diminished players’ salaries.352  Garciaparra 
refused the offer, vehemently asserting that no such market 
correction had occurred.353  In March 2004, the Red Sox made 
one final attempt to re-sign Garciaparra, offering a four-year 
contract worth $12.5 million per season, which Garciaparra 
also rejected for the same reason.354  With his free agent status 
looming, and with his increasingly dour attitude, the Red Sox 
traded Garciaparra to the Chicago Cubs in July 2004.355  After 
the 2004 season, Garciaparra finally obtained the right to 
become a free agent.  Such an attainment proved bittersweet, 
however, as he would re-sign with the Cubs to one-year 
contract worth only $8 million, or less than his “less-than-
  
 348 Id. 
 349 Id. 
 350 See Dan Shaughnessy, Words Don’t Do Justice for Garciaparra, BOSTON 
GLOBE, July 23, 2003, at F1; see also Ken Fidlin, The Last Word, TORONTO SUN, Dec. 
24, 2003, at 101 (stating Garciaparra’s disgust at being “disrespected not only by 
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Shaughnessy, Damaged Goods, supra note 183 (describing Garciaparra as “wildly 
unhappy”); Silverman, supra note 344 (describing how Garciaparra’s “funk in mood” 
was evidenced by his decision to physically separate himself from teammates during a 
pivotal game against the New York Yankees, also describing Garciaparra as “ticked 
off” at Red Sox management). 
 351 See Gordon Edes, Tales from Two Cities: Garciaparra, Sox Offer Differing 
Views on Pre-Trade Events, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2, 2004, at D1. 
 352 See id. 
 353 See Jeff Horrigan, Sox in Winter Wonderland, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 12, 
2003, at 118 (noting that Garciaparra “scoffed at the offer” after the Red Sox justified it 
based on the “changing financial climate in baseball”). 
 354 See Gordon Edes, Force Play: On Trade, Henry Says Epstein Simply Did 
What He Had to Do, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 4, 2004, at F1. 
 355 Id. 
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market value” $9 million annual salary over the preceding four 
years.356 
Garciaparra’s decision to refute the existence of a 
market correction, and instead anchor his value to increasingly 
less-relevant contracts, proved a great disservice to him.  Not 
only may he have cost himself over $40 million, but, by 
participating in unworkable negotiations, put himself through 
needless anguish.  In fact, some believe that his unwillingness 
to recognize modified market conditions ultimately morphed a 
happy person into a miserable one.357  Accordingly, anchoring 
and adjustment effects may not only impair the pursuit of 
objective value (i.e., contractual compensation) but also 
equally-meaningful subjective value (i.e., level of happiness). 
6. Endowment Effects 
Decision-making among professional athletes may also 
be influenced by endowment effects, whereby individuals 
perceive more utility from their current state of affairs than 
from altered, yet equivalent circumstances.358  Such phenomena 
are broadly evident among those contemplating new 
employment opportunities.  For instance, as discussed in 
Section III, employees are often less willing to pay to acquire a 
right or privilege than they are willing to sell it.359   
Among professional athletes, endowment effects appear 
especially apparent when they re-sign at discounted rates, and 
then, as a reason for accepting diminished salary, cite 
employment characteristics that are likely constant among 
employment options.  Perhaps best evincing this idea, consider 
the subjective value ascribed by some professional athletes to 
the quality of their team training staffs.360  Primarily, these 
staffs treat players’ injuries and provide other therapeutic 
  
 356 See Mike Kiley, Cubs’ Daily Double: Nomar, Walker, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 
8, 2004, at 143. 
 357 See, e.g., Jim Donaldson, Leaving Town Was Inevitable for Embittered 
Garciaparra, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 2, 2004, at C1; Shaughnessy, Damaged Goods, 
supra note 183.  See generally  supra note 349 and accompanying sources (providing 
insight on Garciaparra’s unhappiness as a result of his futile contract negotiations with 
the Red Sox). 
 358 See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 105, at 802 & n.29, 803. 
 359 See discussion supra p. 1478. 
 360 See, e.g., George Vescey, Matthews Remembers Houston, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
26, 2000, at D1 (citing remarks by Bruce Matthews of the Tennessee Titans). 
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care.361  Although they undoubtedly vary in quality, empirical 
data suggests that among professional teams in the NFL, MLB, 
NBA, and NHL, all include highly-skilled staff and excellent 
facilities.362  In other words, any actual difference in quality 
may not prove appreciable. 
Some professional athletes, however, appear to place 
significant subjective value in their belief that training staffs 
vary widely in quality.  For instance, when San Francisco 
Giants’ pitcher Jason Christiansen recently re-signed to a 1-
year, $1 million contract—a significantly less lucrative deal 
than he was offered by both the Tampa Bay Devil Rays and 
New York Mets—he cited his “affection for the Giants’ training 
staff” as a reason to take a hometown discount.363  Similarly, 
when the Tennessee Titans re-signed offensive lineman Bruce 
Matthews for less than his market value, he considered the 
team’s “great training staff” as a motivating reason.364  Thus, 
professional athletes may assent to substantial reductions in 
salary in exchange for presumed relative benefits that might, 
in practice, prove illusory. 
Professional sports teams appear cognizant of these 
heuristics.  In fact, they often showcase their training facilities, 
and attempt to impress upon players the presence of variances 
among training facilities and staffs.365  Teams even construct 
new facilities in part for the very purpose of keeping star 
  
 361 See generally Chris Curran & Joe Recknagel of Detroit Lions Athletic 
Training Staff, A Week in an NFL Training Camp, NFL.COM, 
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 364 See Vescey, supra note 360, at D1. 
 365 See Mike O’Hara, New Digs Are “Unbelievable,” DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 31, 
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players, as well as attracting free agents.366  These efforts are 
encouraged by team employees, including those players who 
regard training facilities and staff as crucial to their 
performance.367 
Team manipulation of preferences among professional 
athletes highlights the malleability of employment choice.  
Indeed, by promoting the perception of greater utility from 
current states of affair than from functionally-equivalent 
states, teams exacerbate endowment effects among their 
players.  Such a phenomenon further amplifies the presence of 
cognitive biases and heuristics among professional athletes, 
and thus further suggests non-optimal pursuits of preferences. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In contemplation of employment opportunities, 
professional athletes appear to embrace a myriad mixture of 
preferences, and such preferences frequently reflect the 
placement of considerable value in non-monetary goals.  
Accordingly, for many professional athletes, “optimality” does 
not reflect greed, avarice, or other commonly-held assumptions 
about those individuals; instead, it often comprises intangible, 
even romanticized inclinations, such as loyalty, camaraderie, 
and aspiration for team success.  For that reason, and upon 
deeper reflection, behavioral patterns among contemporary 
professional athletes may not only “remind us of all that was 
once good” in professional sports368—they may also suggest that 
such good never left. 
An analysis limited to preferences, however, ignores the 
presence of cognitive biases and heuristics among professional 
athletes.  Significantly, such influences may distort 
preferences, and yield sub-optimal decision-making.  This is 
especially apparent when professional sports teams impress 
illusory variances among themselves and other teams.  
  
 366 See, e.g., Matt Winkeljohn, New Facility an All-Around Improvement, 
ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 9, 2000, at E6 (describing thought-process among Atlanta 
Falcons’ management officials when contemplating the construction of a new training 
facility). 
 367 See Mike Cobb, Planned Facility Has Bucs Smiling, LEDGER (Florida), 
Mar. 18, 2004, at C3 (citing remarks by Tampa Bay Buccaneers wide receiver Joe 
Jurevicius). 
 368 FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal 1989).  This particular comment refers to the 
belief that professional athletes from the early part of the twentieth century cared 
substantially more about winning games and less about financial remuneration than 
do contemporary athletes. 
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Consequently, professional athletes may unknowingly 
misinterpret their preferences, thereby triggering diminutions 
in both objective value and subjective value. 
The conclusions reached in this Article may prove both 
novel and complimentary.  Indeed, they reflect the first of their 
kind.  Such novelty may offer meaningful insight to 
professional athletes, their representatives, and teams, a group 
collectively worth billions of dollars.  For professional athletes, 
knowledge of cognitive biases and heuristics in their decision-
making may encourage ameliorative cognitive adjustments.  
For instance, instead of discounting or ignoring information 
that challenges existing assumptions about their teams, 
professional athletes might explore the validity and salience of 
such information and determine whether to utilize it in their 
decision-making process.  Similarly, rather than assuming that 
established precedents, such as probable performance metrics, 
do not apply with equal force to themselves, professional 
athletes might instead pursue more expansive consultations.  
By doing so, they might refrain from assenting to poor risk 
contracts, particularly those that are incentive-based or 
otherwise unconventionally-constructed. 
Player representatives may likewise infer strategic 
guidance from these conclusions.  If anything, their role 
appears bolstered by the presence of cognitive distortions 
among professional athletes.  Indeed, player representatives 
may offer objective advice, and because of the intimacy of the 
player-agent relationship, may do so in uniquely compelling 
ways.  Alternatively, player representatives may become more 
attune to subjective preferences among players.  Although 
adherence to such preferences might diminish agent 
compensation, the quality of representation would rise 
commensurate with preference maximization.  Of course, with 
any enlarged role for player representatives comes heightened 
responsibility, as well as the corresponding need to avoid 
cognitive biases in representation. 
Consider also the capacity of professional sports teams 
to adroitly manipulate cognitive biases, and how that capacity 
only amplifies the desirability of professional athletes and their 
representatives to respond accordingly.  As discussed in this 
Article, teams routinely engage in machinations to distort the 
decision-making of professional athletes.  Moreover, teams’ 
continued choice to do so supplies further evidence of cognitive 
biases, as otherwise, they would presumably pursue other 
recruiting and retention strategies.  Accordingly, an enriched 
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ability on the part of players and their representatives to 
counteract cognitive biases would presumably deter such 
behavior or make it more costly. 
Yet perhaps most engagingly, the conclusions reached in 
this Article illuminate the potential for behavioral sciences to 
influence traditional law and economics, as well as theories of 
contract formation.  This is especially true since, unlike other 
population groups that frequently capture the attention of legal 
academics, professional athletes spontaneously furnish 
publishable commentary of their values, beliefs, and priorities, 
and they do so in real world, rather than experimental settings.  
Indeed, by escaping the alleged “experimental flaw” of many 
behavioral law and economic studies, professional athletes offer 
a uniquely appealing group for further examination.  For that 
reason, recognition of how professional athletes respond to 
subjective stimuli, as well as cognitive distortions, may reveal 
as much about us as it does about them. 
